# signet_grant

Step 2: authorize an actor (yourself, for full autonomy) to do specific actions within LIMITS — the mandate is enforced fail-closed on every action. Set require_approval=false for no-human execution. Spend caps + target allowlist + expiry bound the blast radius; revoke anytime (on Solana, revoke DESTROYS the session key). SOLANA (a chain-501 connection + require_approval=false): the grant mints a rail-held session keypair and returns its session_address — fund it with the budget it may spend (its balance is the hard on-chain cap); target_allowlist entries are base58 recipient/program addresses, matched case-SENSITIVELY. Requires Authorization: Bearer <JWT>. A grant can be a STANDING mandate (no_expiry:true, or expires_in_days:0) — a long-lived per-wallet/per-chain authorization the agent keeps and reuses; the spend cap and revoke are the walls, not a clock.

Agent View of the PolicyLayer registry record for `signet_grant`. HTML page: https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/signet-grant

## Facts

- Tool: `signet_grant`
- Server: Rokha (`https://rokha.ai/mcp/jsonrpc`) — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha.md
- Homepage: https://github.com/aetherBytes/rokha-sdk
- Risk category: Financial (Critical risk)
- Registry record: grade F, identity unverified
- Server auth posture: open
- Server rate-limited: no
- Parameters: 12 (3 required)
- Recommended policy verdict: Approval-gated

## Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `actor` | string | yes | who may act — your agent id, or 'self' |
| `chain` | integer | no |  |
| `no_expiry` | boolean | no | true = a STANDING mandate with no expiry (bounded by the spend cap + revoke). Use for a per-chain wallet mandate the agent should keep. |
| `spend_cap` | string | no | cumulative budget, smallest unit (wei) — for pay/transfer |
| `spend_asset` | string | no | 'native' or an ERC-20 address |
| `valid_until` | string | no | or an explicit RFC3339 expiry, or "never" for a standing mandate |
| `action_types` | array | yes | e.g. ["deploy"], ["pay"] |
| `connection_id` | string | yes | from signet_connect |
| `max_per_action` | string | no | per-action ceiling, wei |
| `expires_in_days` | integer | no | grant lifetime in days (default 30). Pass 0 for a STANDING mandate that never expires. |
| `require_approval` | boolean | no | false = autonomous (no human); true = escalate each action to the owner |
| `target_allowlist` | array | no | contract addresses this actor may call |

Parameters from the server's own tool schema.

## Example call (MCP tools/call, JSON-RPC 2.0)

```json
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "signet_grant",
    "arguments": {
      "actor": "<actor>",
      "action_types": [],
      "connection_id": "<connection_id>"
    }
  }
}
```

## Why signet_grant is rated Critical

Grants autonomous financial spending authority on Solana blockchain with configurable spend caps.

From the tool's own definition: "authorize actor, spend caps, session keypair, fund it with the budget, on-chain cap"

Risk signals: High parameter count (12 properties) · Bulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets

## Use case

AI agents use signet_grant to commit financial operations through Rokha, usually the final step of a payment, billing, or trading workflow. A call moves real money.

## Recommended policy (PolicyLayer)

Verdict: **Approval-gated**. Enforced by the PolicyLayer MCP gateway (https://policylayer.com/mcp-gateway) before a call reaches Rokha:

```json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "signet_grant": {
      "deny_if": [
        {
          "conditions": [],
          "on_deny": "Requires human approval."
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

## Other tools on Rokha (215)

- `adspace_bid_cancel` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/adspace-bid-cancel.md
- `delete_harness` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/delete-harness.md
- `hook_delete` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/hook-delete.md
- `rig_node_remove` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/rig-node-remove.md
- `schedule_delete` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/schedule-delete.md
- `signet_paper_reset` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/signet-paper-reset.md
- `signet_revoke` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/signet-revoke.md
- `auth_wallet_verify` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/auth-wallet-verify.md
- `harness_author` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/harness-author.md
- `orbitx__orbitx_gc_focus` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/orbitx--orbitx-gc-focus.md
- `registry_adopt` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/registry-adopt.md
- `registry_list_server` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/registry-list-server.md
- `rig_author` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/rig-author.md
- `rig_run` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/rig-run.md
- `sandbox_exec` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/sandbox-exec.md
- `sandbox_start` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/sandbox-start.md
- `sandbox_stop` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/sandbox-stop.md
- `send_agent_message` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/send-agent-message.md
- `signet_approve` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/signet-approve.md
- `singularityagent__mesh` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/singularityagent--mesh.md
- `studio_doors` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/studio-doors.md
- `x_link_start` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/x-link-start.md
- `adnet_feed` — Financial — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/adnet-feed.md
- `adnet_join` — Financial — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/adnet-join.md
- `ads_order` — Financial — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/ads-order.md
- `adspace_bid` — Financial — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/adspace-bid.md
- `auth_wallet_challenge` — Financial — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/auth-wallet-challenge.md
- `campaign_claim` — Financial — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/campaign-claim.md
- `carry_order` — Financial — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/carry-order.md
- `creator_earnings` — Financial — https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha/creator-earnings.md
- …and 185 more: https://policylayer.com/tools/ai-rokha-rokha.md

## For agents

This record is a snapshot. Live verdicts and the full registry:

- Check every server in your MCP config at once: `npx -y policylayer stack`
- Vet a server before you add it: install the mcp-precheck skill — `npx skills add https://policylayer.com` (skill text: https://policylayer.com/skill.md)
- Query the registry over MCP: endpoint `https://api.policylayer.com/mcp` — tools `check_mcp_server`, `check_mcp_stack`, `check_tool`, `search_registry`, `get_change_events`

---

Source: the PolicyLayer MCP registry — one continuously verified record per MCP server. Full record: https://policylayer.com/registry?q=ai-rokha-rokha · API: https://policylayer.com/registry/api · Policy library: https://policylayer.com/policies/ai-rokha-rokha