# RunAdbShell

RunAdbShell action, Execute an ADB shell command on the Android device and return the command stdout. Read the returned stdout to decide the next step; the stdout may indicate either success or failure.. Parameters: command (string) - ADB shell command to execute

Agent View of the PolicyLayer registry record for `RunAdbShell`. HTML page: https://policylayer.com/tools/android/runadbshell

## Facts

- Tool: `RunAdbShell`
- Server: Android (`@midscene/android-mcp`) — https://policylayer.com/tools/android.md
- Install: `npx -y @midscene/android-mcp`
- Homepage: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@midscene/android-mcp
- Risk category: Execute (High risk)
- Registry record: grade F, identity unverified
- Server rate-limited: no
- Parameters: 7 (1 required)
- Recommended policy verdict: Rate-limited

## Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `command` | string | yes | ADB shell command to execute |
| `android.deviceId` | string | no | Android device ID (from adb devices) |
| `android.useScrcpy` | boolean | no | Enable scrcpy accelerated screenshots |
| `android.aiActContext` | string | no | Background knowledge passed to aiAct. Default: no extra context. |
| `android.waitAfterAction` | number | no | Wait time in milliseconds after each action execution. Default: 300ms. |
| `android.replanningCycleLimit` | integer | no | Maximum number of replanning cycles for aiAct. Default: model adapter default. |
| `android.screenshotShrinkFactor` | number | no | Screenshot shrink factor before sending images to AI. Default: 1; high values may reduce recognition quality, especially on mobile. |

Parameters from the server's own tool schema.

## Example call (MCP tools/call, JSON-RPC 2.0)

```json
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "RunAdbShell",
    "arguments": {
      "command": "<command>"
    }
  }
}
```

## Why RunAdbShell is rated High

This tool executes arbitrary shell commands on an Android device via ADB, which is the Execute category. The severity is critical because unrestricted shell command execution can lead to complete device compromise, data exfiltration, malware installation, or lateral movement.

From the tool's own definition: "Tool explicitly states it 'Execute[s] an ADB shell command on the Android device' with a command parameter accepting arbitrary ADB shell commands. ADB shell provides full shell access to the Android device."

Risk signals: Accepts freeform code/query input (command)

## Use case

AI agents invoke RunAdbShell to trigger actions in Android. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.

## Recommended policy (PolicyLayer)

Verdict: **Rate-limited**. Enforced by the PolicyLayer MCP gateway (https://policylayer.com/mcp-gateway) before a call reaches Android:

```json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "RunAdbShell": {
      "limits": [
        {
          "counter": "runadbshell_rate",
          "window": "minute",
          "max": 10,
          "scope": "grant"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

## Other tools on Android (22)

- `ClearInput` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/clearinput.md
- `act` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/act.md
- `android_connect` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/android-connect.md
- `AndroidBackButton` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/androidbackbutton.md
- `AndroidHomeButton` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/androidhomebutton.md
- `AndroidRecentAppsButton` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/androidrecentappsbutton.md
- `CursorMove` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/cursormove.md
- `DoubleClick` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/doubleclick.md
- `DragAndDrop` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/draganddrop.md
- `KeyboardPress` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/keyboardpress.md
- `Launch` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/launch.md
- `LongPress` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/longpress.md
- `Pinch` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/pinch.md
- `PullGesture` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/pullgesture.md
- `Scroll` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/scroll.md
- `Swipe` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/swipe.md
- `Tap` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/tap.md
- `Terminate` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/terminate.md
- `take_screenshot` — Read — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/take-screenshot.md
- `android_disconnect` — Write — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/android-disconnect.md
- `assert` — Write — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/assert.md
- `Input` — Write — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/input.md

## For agents

This record is a snapshot. Live verdicts and the full registry:

- Check every server in your MCP config at once: `npx -y policylayer stack`
- Vet a server before you add it: install the mcp-precheck skill — `npx skills add https://policylayer.com` (skill text: https://policylayer.com/skill.md)
- Query the registry over MCP: endpoint `https://api.policylayer.com/mcp` — tools `check_mcp_server`, `check_mcp_stack`, `check_tool`, `search_registry`, `get_change_events`

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Source: the PolicyLayer MCP registry — one continuously verified record per MCP server. Full record: https://policylayer.com/registry?q=android · API: https://policylayer.com/registry/api · Policy library: https://policylayer.com/policies/android