# Tap

Tap action, Tap the element. Parameters: locate (object) - The element to be tapped

Agent View of the PolicyLayer registry record for `Tap`. HTML page: https://policylayer.com/tools/android/tap

## Facts

- Tool: `Tap`
- Server: Android (`@midscene/android-mcp`) — https://policylayer.com/tools/android.md
- Install: `npx -y @midscene/android-mcp`
- Homepage: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@midscene/android-mcp
- Risk category: Execute (High risk)
- Registry record: grade F, identity unverified
- Server rate-limited: no
- Parameters: 7 (1 required)
- Recommended policy verdict: Rate-limited

## Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `locate` | object | yes | The element to be tapped |
| `android.deviceId` | string | no | Android device ID (from adb devices) |
| `android.useScrcpy` | boolean | no | Enable scrcpy accelerated screenshots |
| `android.aiActContext` | string | no | Background knowledge passed to aiAct. Default: no extra context. |
| `android.waitAfterAction` | number | no | Wait time in milliseconds after each action execution. Default: 300ms. |
| `android.replanningCycleLimit` | integer | no | Maximum number of replanning cycles for aiAct. Default: model adapter default. |
| `android.screenshotShrinkFactor` | number | no | Screenshot shrink factor before sending images to AI. Default: 1; high values may reduce recognition quality, especially on mobile. |

Parameters from the server's own tool schema.

## Example call (MCP tools/call, JSON-RPC 2.0)

```json
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "Tap",
    "arguments": {
      "locate": {}
    }
  }
}
```

## Why Tap is rated High

Tapping a UI element on an Android device is an Execute-category action: it triggers real device interactions whose effects depend entirely on which element is tapped. It could open apps, submit forms, confirm dialogs, or trigger other operations. The blast radius is medium because misuse could cause unintended actions on the device, but it is not inherently destructive or financial on its own.

From the tool's own definition: "'Tap action, Tap the element' — triggers a UI tap/click interaction on an Android device element, causing external side effects depending on what element is tapped."

Risk signals: High parameter count (12 properties)

## Use case

AI agents invoke Tap to trigger actions in Android. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.

## Recommended policy (PolicyLayer)

Verdict: **Rate-limited**. Enforced by the PolicyLayer MCP gateway (https://policylayer.com/mcp-gateway) before a call reaches Android:

```json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "Tap": {
      "limits": [
        {
          "counter": "tap_rate",
          "window": "minute",
          "max": 10,
          "scope": "grant"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

## Other tools on Android (22)

- `ClearInput` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/clearinput.md
- `act` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/act.md
- `android_connect` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/android-connect.md
- `AndroidBackButton` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/androidbackbutton.md
- `AndroidHomeButton` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/androidhomebutton.md
- `AndroidRecentAppsButton` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/androidrecentappsbutton.md
- `CursorMove` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/cursormove.md
- `DoubleClick` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/doubleclick.md
- `DragAndDrop` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/draganddrop.md
- `KeyboardPress` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/keyboardpress.md
- `Launch` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/launch.md
- `LongPress` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/longpress.md
- `Pinch` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/pinch.md
- `PullGesture` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/pullgesture.md
- `RunAdbShell` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/runadbshell.md
- `Scroll` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/scroll.md
- `Swipe` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/swipe.md
- `Terminate` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/terminate.md
- `take_screenshot` — Read — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/take-screenshot.md
- `android_disconnect` — Write — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/android-disconnect.md
- `assert` — Write — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/assert.md
- `Input` — Write — https://policylayer.com/tools/android/input.md

## For agents

This record is a snapshot. Live verdicts and the full registry:

- Check every server in your MCP config at once: `npx -y policylayer stack`
- Vet a server before you add it: install the mcp-precheck skill — `npx skills add https://policylayer.com` (skill text: https://policylayer.com/skill.md)
- Query the registry over MCP: endpoint `https://api.policylayer.com/mcp` — tools `check_mcp_server`, `check_mcp_stack`, `check_tool`, `search_registry`, `get_change_events`

---

Source: the PolicyLayer MCP registry — one continuously verified record per MCP server. Full record: https://policylayer.com/registry?q=android · API: https://policylayer.com/registry/api · Policy library: https://policylayer.com/policies/android