# get_cloud_connect_supported_features Use this when the user wants to know which DoiT CloudConnect features a connected AWS account supports and whether the account currently has the required permissions for each feature. Accepts a 12-digit AWS account ID, including AWS standalone accounts. Azure tenant IDs are unsupported. Returns the list of supported features with their permission status. Agent View of the PolicyLayer registry record for `get_cloud_connect_supported_features`. HTML page: https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/get-cloud-connect-supported-features ## Facts - Tool: `get_cloud_connect_supported_features` - Server: Doit (`@doitintl/doit-mcp-server`) — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit.md - Install: `npx -y @doitintl/doit-mcp-server` - Homepage: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@doitintl/doit-mcp-server - Risk category: Read (Low risk) - Registry record: grade F, identity unverified - Server rate-limited: no - Parameters: 1 (1 required) - Recommended policy verdict: Allowed ## Parameters | Parameter | Type | Required | Description | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | `accountID` | string | yes | The 12-digit AWS account ID to check supported features for (including AWS standalone accounts). | Parameters from the server's own tool schema. ## Example call (MCP tools/call, JSON-RPC 2.0) ```json { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "get_cloud_connect_supported_features", "arguments": { "accountID": "" } } } ``` ## Why get_cloud_connect_supported_features is rated Low Even though get_cloud_connect_supported_features only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing. ## Use case AI agents call get_cloud_connect_supported_features to retrieve information from Doit without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere. ## Recommended policy (PolicyLayer) Verdict: **Allowed**. Enforced by the PolicyLayer MCP gateway (https://policylayer.com/mcp-gateway) before a call reaches Doit: ```json { "version": "1", "default": "deny", "tools": { "get_cloud_connect_supported_features": {} } } ``` ## Other tools on Doit (237) - `cancel_async_operation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/cancel-async-operation.md - `cancel_invite` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/cancel-invite.md - `confirm_action` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/confirm-action.md - `delete_account_role` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-account-role.md - `delete_alert` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-alert.md - `delete_allocation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-allocation.md - `delete_annotation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-annotation.md - `delete_ava_conversation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-ava-conversation.md - `delete_budget` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-budget.md - `delete_cloudflow_connection` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-cloudflow-connection.md - `delete_custom_theme` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-custom-theme.md - `delete_customer_geographic_access_scope` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-customer-geographic-access-scope.md - `delete_customer_group` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-customer-group.md - `delete_datahub_dataset` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-datahub-dataset.md - `delete_datahub_datasets` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-datahub-datasets.md - `delete_datahub_events_by_filter` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-datahub-events-by-filter.md - `delete_folder` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-folder.md - `delete_geographic_access_custom_region` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-geographic-access-custom-region.md - `delete_insight_result` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-insight-result.md - `delete_insight_results` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-insight-results.md - `delete_label` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-label.md - `delete_report` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-report.md - `delete_role` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-role.md - `delete_service_account` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-service-account.md - `delete_service_account_token` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-service-account-token.md - `delete_user` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-user.md - `delete_user_geographic_access_scope` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-user-geographic-access-scope.md - `id_of_asset` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/id-of-asset.md - `remove_ticket_tags` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/remove-ticket-tags.md - `async_run_inline` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/async-run-inline.md - …and 207 more: https://policylayer.com/tools/doit.md ## For agents This record is a snapshot. Live verdicts and the full registry: - Check every server in your MCP config at once: `npx -y policylayer stack` - Vet a server before you add it: install the mcp-precheck skill — `npx skills add https://policylayer.com` (skill text: https://policylayer.com/skill.md) - Query the registry over MCP: endpoint `https://api.policylayer.com/mcp` — tools `check_mcp_server`, `check_mcp_stack`, `check_tool`, `search_registry`, `get_change_events` --- Source: the PolicyLayer MCP registry — one continuously verified record per MCP server. Full record: https://policylayer.com/registry?q=doit · API: https://policylayer.com/registry/api · Policy library: https://policylayer.com/policies/doit