# get_entity_invoice_explainer

Explain month-over-month changes in invoiced cloud costs. Returns invoiced cost changes for an invoice owned by the specified billing profile in the authenticated tenant.

Agent View of the PolicyLayer registry record for `get_entity_invoice_explainer`. HTML page: https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/get-entity-invoice-explainer

## Facts

- Tool: `get_entity_invoice_explainer`
- Server: Doit (`@doitintl/doit-mcp-server`) — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit.md
- Install: `npx -y @doitintl/doit-mcp-server`
- Homepage: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@doitintl/doit-mcp-server
- Risk category: Read (Low risk)
- Registry record: grade F, identity unverified
- Server rate-limited: no
- Parameters: 4 (2 required)
- Recommended policy verdict: Allowed

## Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `X-Tenant-Id` | string | no |  |
| `invoiceNumber` | string | yes |  |
| `customerContext` | string | no | Scope the request to a specific customer by ID. Required for DoiT employees (whose token isn't tied to a single customer); omit for direct customer users. |
| `billingProfileId` | string | yes |  |

Parameters from the server's own tool schema.

## Example call (MCP tools/call, JSON-RPC 2.0)

```json
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "get_entity_invoice_explainer",
    "arguments": {
      "invoiceNumber": "<invoiceNumber>",
      "billingProfileId": "<billingProfileId>"
    }
  }
}
```

## Why get_entity_invoice_explainer is rated Low

Even though get_entity_invoice_explainer only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.

## Use case

AI agents call get_entity_invoice_explainer to retrieve information from Doit without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.

## Recommended policy (PolicyLayer)

Verdict: **Allowed**. Enforced by the PolicyLayer MCP gateway (https://policylayer.com/mcp-gateway) before a call reaches Doit:

```json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "get_entity_invoice_explainer": {}
  }
}
```

## Other tools on Doit (237)

- `cancel_async_operation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/cancel-async-operation.md
- `cancel_invite` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/cancel-invite.md
- `confirm_action` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/confirm-action.md
- `delete_account_role` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-account-role.md
- `delete_alert` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-alert.md
- `delete_allocation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-allocation.md
- `delete_annotation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-annotation.md
- `delete_ava_conversation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-ava-conversation.md
- `delete_budget` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-budget.md
- `delete_cloudflow_connection` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-cloudflow-connection.md
- `delete_custom_theme` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-custom-theme.md
- `delete_customer_geographic_access_scope` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-customer-geographic-access-scope.md
- `delete_customer_group` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-customer-group.md
- `delete_datahub_dataset` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-datahub-dataset.md
- `delete_datahub_datasets` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-datahub-datasets.md
- `delete_datahub_events_by_filter` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-datahub-events-by-filter.md
- `delete_folder` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-folder.md
- `delete_geographic_access_custom_region` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-geographic-access-custom-region.md
- `delete_insight_result` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-insight-result.md
- `delete_insight_results` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-insight-results.md
- `delete_label` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-label.md
- `delete_report` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-report.md
- `delete_role` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-role.md
- `delete_service_account` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-service-account.md
- `delete_service_account_token` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-service-account-token.md
- `delete_user` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-user.md
- `delete_user_geographic_access_scope` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-user-geographic-access-scope.md
- `id_of_asset` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/id-of-asset.md
- `remove_ticket_tags` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/remove-ticket-tags.md
- `async_run_inline` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/async-run-inline.md
- …and 207 more: https://policylayer.com/tools/doit.md

## For agents

This record is a snapshot. Live verdicts and the full registry:

- Check every server in your MCP config at once: `npx -y policylayer stack`
- Vet a server before you add it: install the mcp-precheck skill — `npx skills add https://policylayer.com` (skill text: https://policylayer.com/skill.md)
- Query the registry over MCP: endpoint `https://api.policylayer.com/mcp` — tools `check_mcp_server`, `check_mcp_stack`, `check_tool`, `search_registry`, `get_change_events`

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Source: the PolicyLayer MCP registry — one continuously verified record per MCP server. Full record: https://policylayer.com/registry?q=doit · API: https://policylayer.com/registry/api · Policy library: https://policylayer.com/policies/doit