# get_signup_request

Start a Cloud Intelligence trial for an organization that is not yet a DoiT customer. These operations require no API key: they are rate limited, idempotent, and provision nothing until the organization's admin verifies the request. Agents create a request and hand the returned consentUrl to the admin; the admin verifies by entering the emailed code (or signing the request on the console), after which the tenant is provisioned and the request reports its customer id. Returns the current state of a signup request. Poll at the returned pollAfterSeconds cadence; once status is completed the response carries customerId, consoleUrl and signInUrl. The response never includes the requester's email or the verification code.

Agent View of the PolicyLayer registry record for `get_signup_request`. HTML page: https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/get-signup-request

## Facts

- Tool: `get_signup_request`
- Server: Doit (`@doitintl/doit-mcp-server`) — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit.md
- Install: `npx -y @doitintl/doit-mcp-server`
- Homepage: https://www.npmjs.com/package/@doitintl/doit-mcp-server
- Risk category: Read (Low risk)
- Registry record: grade F, identity unverified
- Server rate-limited: no
- Parameters: 2 (1 required)
- Recommended policy verdict: Allowed

## Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `customerContext` | string | no | Scope the request to a specific customer by ID. Required for DoiT employees (whose token isn't tied to a single customer); omit for direct customer users. |
| `signupRequestId` | string | yes |  |

Parameters from the server's own tool schema.

## Example call (MCP tools/call, JSON-RPC 2.0)

```json
{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "get_signup_request",
    "arguments": {
      "signupRequestId": "<signupRequestId>"
    }
  }
}
```

## Why get_signup_request is rated Low

Even though get_signup_request only reads data, uncontrolled read access leaks sensitive information and racks up API costs: an agent caught in a retry loop can make thousands of calls a minute without anyone noticing.

Risk signals: Admin/system-level operation

## Use case

AI agents call get_signup_request to retrieve information from Doit without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.

## Recommended policy (PolicyLayer)

Verdict: **Allowed**. Enforced by the PolicyLayer MCP gateway (https://policylayer.com/mcp-gateway) before a call reaches Doit:

```json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "get_signup_request": {}
  }
}
```

## Other tools on Doit (237)

- `cancel_async_operation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/cancel-async-operation.md
- `cancel_invite` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/cancel-invite.md
- `confirm_action` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/confirm-action.md
- `delete_account_role` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-account-role.md
- `delete_alert` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-alert.md
- `delete_allocation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-allocation.md
- `delete_annotation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-annotation.md
- `delete_ava_conversation` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-ava-conversation.md
- `delete_budget` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-budget.md
- `delete_cloudflow_connection` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-cloudflow-connection.md
- `delete_custom_theme` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-custom-theme.md
- `delete_customer_geographic_access_scope` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-customer-geographic-access-scope.md
- `delete_customer_group` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-customer-group.md
- `delete_datahub_dataset` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-datahub-dataset.md
- `delete_datahub_datasets` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-datahub-datasets.md
- `delete_datahub_events_by_filter` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-datahub-events-by-filter.md
- `delete_folder` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-folder.md
- `delete_geographic_access_custom_region` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-geographic-access-custom-region.md
- `delete_insight_result` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-insight-result.md
- `delete_insight_results` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-insight-results.md
- `delete_label` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-label.md
- `delete_report` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-report.md
- `delete_role` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-role.md
- `delete_service_account` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-service-account.md
- `delete_service_account_token` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-service-account-token.md
- `delete_user` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-user.md
- `delete_user_geographic_access_scope` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/delete-user-geographic-access-scope.md
- `id_of_asset` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/id-of-asset.md
- `remove_ticket_tags` — Destructive — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/remove-ticket-tags.md
- `async_run_inline` — Execute — https://policylayer.com/tools/doit/async-run-inline.md
- …and 207 more: https://policylayer.com/tools/doit.md

## For agents

This record is a snapshot. Live verdicts and the full registry:

- Check every server in your MCP config at once: `npx -y policylayer stack`
- Vet a server before you add it: install the mcp-precheck skill — `npx skills add https://policylayer.com` (skill text: https://policylayer.com/skill.md)
- Query the registry over MCP: endpoint `https://api.policylayer.com/mcp` — tools `check_mcp_server`, `check_mcp_stack`, `check_tool`, `search_registry`, `get_change_events`

---

Source: the PolicyLayer MCP registry — one continuously verified record per MCP server. Full record: https://policylayer.com/registry?q=doit · API: https://policylayer.com/registry/api · Policy library: https://policylayer.com/policies/doit