Returns the routing anomalies the bgp-monitor has observed against TunnelMind's BGP watchlist — the witnessability layer's routing dimension. The monitor polls RIPEstat (RIPE NCC) on a cron, self-baselines each watched prefix's origin set on first sight, then records an event whenever a later pol...
Part of the TunnelMind Data API server.
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AI agents call get_bgp_events to retrieve information from TunnelMind Data API without modifying any data. This is common in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows where the agent needs context before taking action. Because read operations don't change state, they are generally safe to allow without restrictions -- but you may still want rate limits to control API costs.
Even though get_bgp_events only reads data, uncontrolled read access can leak sensitive information or rack up API costs. An agent caught in a retry loop could make thousands of calls per minute. A rate limit gives you a safety net without blocking legitimate use.
Read-only tools are safe to allow by default. No rate limit needed unless you want to control costs.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"get_bgp_events": {}
}
}See the full TunnelMind Data API policy for all 54 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access get_bgp_events gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other read tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: allow, with a rate cap to control cost.
Returns the routing anomalies the bgp-monitor has observed against TunnelMind's BGP watchlist — the witnessability layer's routing dimension. The monitor polls RIPEstat (RIPE NCC) on a cron, self-baselines each watched prefix's origin set on first sight, then records an event whenever a later poll deviates from that baseline. Use this to check whether a prefix or ASN you depend on (an SSP's egress, a publisher's network, your own infrastructure) has shown a hijack-shaped routing event. event_type is one of: - origin_change — an origin AS not in the baseline is announcing the prefix (severity critical if that announcement also fails RPKI, else high). - rpki_invalid — a current announcement fails RPKI ROA validation. - withdrawn — a previously-announced prefix is no longer visible. - new_more_specific / visibility_drop — reserved for a later monitor pass. prev_origins is the baseline the event deviated from. count is the full filtered set; events is bounded by limit, newest first. An empty events array means no anomalies in the window — the honest "all clear".. It is categorised as a Read tool in the TunnelMind Data API MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the TunnelMind Data API MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for get_bgp_events: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches TunnelMind Data API. Nothing to install.
get_bgp_events is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the get_bgp_events rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for get_bgp_events. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
get_bgp_events is provided by the TunnelMind Data API MCP server (https://mcp-data.tunnelmind.ai/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 54 TunnelMind Data API tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
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