Reconstructs the supply paths for a publisher domain from Sigil's own crawl and returns them ITEMIZED — distinct from sigil_verify_supply_chain (which verifies a schain the caller brings) and from signal_dark_pool_risk (which returns only aggregate counts). Every SSP the publisher declares it sel...
Risk signalsBulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets
Part of the TunnelMind Data API server.
Free to start. No card required.
AI agents use sigil_traverse to create or modify resources in TunnelMind Data API. Write operations carry medium risk because an autonomous agent could trigger bulk unintended modifications. Rate limits prevent a single agent session from making hundreds of changes in rapid succession. Argument validation ensures the agent passes expected values.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call sigil_traverse repeatedly, creating or modifying resources faster than any human could review. PolicyLayer's rate limiting ensures write operations happen at a controlled pace, and argument validation catches malformed or unexpected inputs before they reach TunnelMind Data API.
Write tools can modify data. A rate limit prevents runaway bulk operations from AI agents.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"sigil_traverse": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "sigil_traverse_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 30,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}See the full TunnelMind Data API policy for all 54 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access sigil_traverse gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other write tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: rate-limit and validate the arguments.
Reconstructs the supply paths for a publisher domain from Sigil's own crawl and returns them ITEMIZED — distinct from sigil_verify_supply_chain (which verifies a schain the caller brings) and from signal_dark_pool_risk (which returns only aggregate counts). Every SSP the publisher declares it sells through is joined to that SSP's identity and classified two-sided against the SSP's sellers.json: corroborated (seat present), contradicted (SSP crawled but seller_id absent — real risk), unchecked (SSP not yet crawled — not risk). Each returned path also carries resells_to, one level of downstream reseller expansion. The list is ordered riskiest-first (contradicted, then reseller) so a truncated page is still the most useful; the supply_paths counts are always over the FULL set. in_supply_graph:false when the domain is not a known publisher.. It is categorised as a Write tool in the TunnelMind Data API MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the TunnelMind Data API MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for sigil_traverse: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches TunnelMind Data API. Nothing to install.
sigil_traverse is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the sigil_traverse rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for sigil_traverse. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
sigil_traverse is provided by the TunnelMind Data API MCP server (https://mcp-data.tunnelmind.ai/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 54 TunnelMind Data API tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
4,600+ MCP servers and 31,000+ tools scanned and risk-classified.