Use when the agent has a specific (crate, fn_name) pair and wants to know what inputs it actually accepts at runtime — e.g. (crate='jiff', fn_name='Timestamp::from_str') for methods, (crate='ascii85', fn_name='decode') for free functions. fn_name accepts BOTH qualified (Type::method / module::fn)...
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AI agents call behavior_lookup to retrieve information from Codeitall without modifying any data. This is common in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows where the agent needs context before taking action. Because read operations don't change state, they are generally safe to allow without restrictions -- but you may still want rate limits to control API costs.
Even though behavior_lookup only reads data, uncontrolled read access can leak sensitive information or rack up API costs. An agent caught in a retry loop could make thousands of calls per minute. A rate limit gives you a safety net without blocking legitimate use.
Read-only tools are safe to allow by default. No rate limit needed unless you want to control costs.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"behavior_lookup": {}
}
}See the full Codeitall policy for all 8 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access behavior_lookup gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other read tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: allow, with a rate cap to control cost.
Use when the agent has a specific (crate, fn_name) pair and wants to know what inputs it actually accepts at runtime — e.g. (crate='jiff', fn_name='Timestamp::from_str') for methods, (crate='ascii85', fn_name='decode') for free functions. fn_name accepts BOTH qualified (Type::method / module::fn) and bare (method / fn) forms — the matcher tries the exact input first, then the alternate form; the matched_fn_name response field records the substitution when one happened. Returns the probe observation table verbatim from the substrate: each row is (input, outcome=ok|err|panic, value or error variant). Pass an optional inputs array to filter to specific input strings. On a zero-hit the response carries a diagnostics block (received_crate, received_fn_name, closest_crates, closest_fns_in_crate, hint) so the agent can self-correct without a dead-end round-trip. The substrate's discrimination findings live here — runtime behaviour the docs are silent or wrong about.. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Codeitall MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.
Register the Codeitall MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for behavior_lookup: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Codeitall. Nothing to install.
behavior_lookup is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the behavior_lookup rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for behavior_lookup. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
behavior_lookup is provided by the Codeitall MCP server (https://api.codeitall.dev/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 8 Codeitall tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
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