Revoke a vault container transfer ID. Once revoked, the transfer ID cannot be used again. Example: vault_container_revoke({ transferId:
Part of the 0nmcp server.
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AI agents may call vault_container_revoke to permanently remove or destroy resources in 0nmcp. Without a policy, an autonomous agent could delete critical data in a loop with no way to undo the damage. PolicyLayer blocks destructive tools by default and requires explicit human approval before enabling them.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call vault_container_revoke in a loop, permanently destroying resources in 0nmcp. There is no undo for destructive operations. PolicyLayer blocks this tool by default and only allows it when a human explicitly approves the action.
Destructive tools permanently remove data. Block by default. Only enable with explicit approval workflows.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"vault_container_revoke"
]
}See the full 0nmcp policy for all 407 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access vault_container_revoke gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other destructive tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: deny by default, or require human approval.
Revoke a vault container transfer ID. Once revoked, the transfer ID cannot be used again. Example: vault_container_revoke({ transferId:. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the 0nmcp MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the 0n MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for vault_container_revoke: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches 0nmcp. Nothing to install.
vault_container_revoke is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the vault_container_revoke rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for vault_container_revoke. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
vault_container_revoke is provided by the 0n MCP server (0nmcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 407 0nmcp tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
4,600+ MCP servers and 31,000+ tools scanned and risk-classified.