Low Risk

nexus_list_telegram_users

List all users in the organization who have connected Telegram. Useful to know who can receive Telegram messages.

Risk signalsBulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets

Part of the Nexus server.

nexus_list_telegram_users is read-only, but an agent in a loop can still rack up calls and cost. PolicyLayer caps every call before it runs. Live in minutes.

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AI agents call nexus_list_telegram_users to retrieve information from Nexus without modifying any data. This is common in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows where the agent needs context before taking action. Because read operations don't change state, they are generally safe to allow without restrictions -- but you may still want rate limits to control API costs.

Even though nexus_list_telegram_users only reads data, uncontrolled read access can leak sensitive information or rack up API costs. An agent caught in a retry loop could make thousands of calls per minute. A rate limit gives you a safety net without blocking legitimate use.

Read-only tools are safe to allow by default. No rate limit needed unless you want to control costs.

policy.json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "nexus_list_telegram_users": {}
  }
}

See the full Nexus policy for all 41 tools.

Get this rule live on your own Nexus server in minutes. PolicyLayer enforces it on every call, before it runs.

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These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access nexus_list_telegram_users gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:

Browse the full MCP Attack Database →

Every attack above starts with a tool call. PolicyLayer checks each one against your policy first, so nexus_list_telegram_users only ever does what you allow.

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Other read tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: allow, with a rate cap to control cost.

What does the nexus_list_telegram_users tool do? +

List all users in the organization who have connected Telegram. Useful to know who can receive Telegram messages.. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Nexus MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on nexus_list_telegram_users? +

Register the Nexus MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for nexus_list_telegram_users: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Nexus. Nothing to install.

What risk level is nexus_list_telegram_users? +

nexus_list_telegram_users is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit nexus_list_telegram_users? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the nexus_list_telegram_users rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block nexus_list_telegram_users completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for nexus_list_telegram_users. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides nexus_list_telegram_users? +

nexus_list_telegram_users is provided by the Nexus MCP server (nexus-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

Enforce policy on every Nexus tool call.

Deterministic rules across all 41 Nexus tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.

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