Surgically edit a PipelineExecution's metadata, currentStepId, or status without re-running the workflow. EXCEPTION-ONLY tool. Primary use case: relabeling a stuck or test run's executionName so it's distinguishable in the executions list, without spending credits on a rerun. Other use cases: - U...
Risk signalsAccepts file system path (patches[].path) · High parameter count (10 properties) · Admin/system-level operation
Part of the Agentled server.
Free to start. No card required.
AI agents use patch_execution_fields to create or modify resources in Agentled. Write operations carry medium risk because an autonomous agent could trigger bulk unintended modifications. Rate limits prevent a single agent session from making hundreds of changes in rapid succession. Argument validation ensures the agent passes expected values.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call patch_execution_fields repeatedly, creating or modifying resources faster than any human could review. PolicyLayer's rate limiting ensures write operations happen at a controlled pace, and argument validation catches malformed or unexpected inputs before they reach Agentled.
Write tools can modify data. A rate limit prevents runaway bulk operations from AI agents.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"patch_execution_fields": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "patch_execution_fields_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 30,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
} See the full Agentled policy for all 119 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access patch_execution_fields gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other write tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: rate-limit and validate the arguments.
Surgically edit a PipelineExecution's metadata, currentStepId, or status without re-running the workflow. EXCEPTION-ONLY tool. Primary use case: relabeling a stuck or test run's executionName so it's distinguishable in the executions list, without spending credits on a rerun. Other use cases: - Update metadata.debugNote during incident investigation - Update metadata.pendingReasonTag for UI annotation - Advance currentStepId for stuck-state recovery (only when status is waiting or failed) - Force status transitions: waiting/failed/credits_missing → running DO NOT use for routine work. If you find yourself reaching for this tool repeatedly, the underlying workflow is misconfigured and the right fix is to update the workflow definition or the execution input. Required: - API key with admin:patch scope (Stage 2) - reason, expectedUpdatedAt — same as patch_timeline_fields Allowed paths: - metadata.debugNote - metadata.pendingReasonTag - metadata.executionName (relabel run; orchestrator may recompute via executionNameTemplate) - currentStepId (only when status is waiting or failed) - status (only waiting → running, failed → running, credits_missing → running) Forbidden: - Wholesale metadata replacement (must use sub-paths) - Analytics totals (totalCreditsUsed, creditsUsed, analyticsExtracted, etc. — anything not in the allowlist) - Identity fields, executionContent, completedAt, terminal-status executions Audit: each patch appends an entry to metadata.adminPatchLog with { actor, apiKeyId, reason, diffs, timestamp }. This is the §8.1 short-term storage location — sufficient for the exception-only use case. Returns: { patched, dryRun, auditId, diff, record }. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Agentled MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Agentled MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for patch_execution_fields: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Agentled. Nothing to install.
patch_execution_fields is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the patch_execution_fields rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for patch_execution_fields. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
patch_execution_fields is provided by the Agentled MCP server (@agentled/mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 119 Agentled tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
4,600+ MCP servers and 31,000+ tools scanned and risk-classified.