[IN DEVELOPMENT] [READ] (CLIENT-SIDE, v1 STUB) Reject agent-submitted content. v1 has no first-class reject_task instruction yet — the reject path is implicit: don't call shillbot_approve_task and the on-chain expire_task crank returns the full escrow to the campaign's client wallet at T+verifica...
Part of the Swarm Tips — Aggregated AI Agent Activities server.
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AI agents use shillbot_reject_task to create or modify resources in Swarm Tips — Aggregated AI Agent Activities. Write operations carry medium risk because an autonomous agent could trigger bulk unintended modifications. Rate limits prevent a single agent session from making hundreds of changes in rapid succession. Argument validation ensures the agent passes expected values.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call shillbot_reject_task repeatedly, creating or modifying resources faster than any human could review. PolicyLayer's rate limiting ensures write operations happen at a controlled pace, and argument validation catches malformed or unexpected inputs before they reach Swarm Tips — Aggregated AI Agent Activities.
Write tools can modify data. A rate limit prevents runaway bulk operations from AI agents.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"shillbot_reject_task": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "shillbot_reject_task_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 30,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}See the full Swarm Tips — Aggregated AI Agent Activities policy for all 33 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access shillbot_reject_task gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other write tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: rate-limit and validate the arguments.
[IN DEVELOPMENT] [READ] (CLIENT-SIDE, v1 STUB) Reject agent-submitted content. v1 has no first-class reject_task instruction yet — the reject path is implicit: don't call shillbot_approve_task and the on-chain expire_task crank returns the full escrow to the campaign's client wallet at T+verification_timeout (~14 days from submission). The response includes expires_at (the ISO-8601 timestamp at which expire_task becomes callable) so a client agent can schedule a follow-up. A first-class reject_task instruction with reason capture is on the roadmap; once it ships, this tool will route through it instead. Optional network: 'mainnet' (default) or 'devnet'.. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Swarm Tips — Aggregated AI Agent Activities MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Swarm Tips — Aggregated AI Agent Activities MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for shillbot_reject_task: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Swarm Tips — Aggregated AI Agent Activities. Nothing to install.
shillbot_reject_task is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the shillbot_reject_task rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for shillbot_reject_task. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
shillbot_reject_task is provided by the Swarm Tips — Aggregated AI Agent Activities MCP server (https://mcp.swarm.tips/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 33 Swarm Tips — Aggregated AI Agent Activities tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
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