Low Risk

list_pending_invites

List pending organization invites for the current user.

Part of the ContextLayer server.

list_pending_invites is read-only, but an agent in a loop can still rack up calls and cost. PolicyLayer caps every call before it runs. Live in minutes.

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AI agents call list_pending_invites to retrieve information from ContextLayer without modifying any data. This is common in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows where the agent needs context before taking action. Because read operations don't change state, they are generally safe to allow without restrictions -- but you may still want rate limits to control API costs.

Even though list_pending_invites only reads data, uncontrolled read access can leak sensitive information or rack up API costs. An agent caught in a retry loop could make thousands of calls per minute. A rate limit gives you a safety net without blocking legitimate use.

Read-only tools are safe to allow by default. No rate limit needed unless you want to control costs.

policy.json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "list_pending_invites": {}
  }
}

See the full ContextLayer policy for all 62 tools.

Get this rule live on your own ContextLayer server in minutes. PolicyLayer enforces it on every call, before it runs.

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These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access list_pending_invites gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:

Browse the full MCP Attack Database →

Every attack above starts with a tool call. PolicyLayer checks each one against your policy first, so list_pending_invites only ever does what you allow.

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Other read tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: allow, with a rate cap to control cost.

What does the list_pending_invites tool do? +

List pending organization invites for the current user.. It is categorised as a Read tool in the ContextLayer MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on list_pending_invites? +

Register the ContextLayer MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for list_pending_invites: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches ContextLayer. Nothing to install.

What risk level is list_pending_invites? +

list_pending_invites is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit list_pending_invites? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the list_pending_invites rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block list_pending_invites completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for list_pending_invites. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides list_pending_invites? +

list_pending_invites is provided by the ContextLayer MCP server (https://api.dotnova.io/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

Enforce policy on every ContextLayer tool call.

Deterministic rules across all 62 ContextLayer tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.

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4,600+ MCP servers and 31,000+ tools scanned and risk-classified.

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