Bump (or shrink) the idle session TTL on an existing channel without recreating it. Use when an agent started a short-TTL channel for what was supposed to be a quick task but the conversation extended past the original window, OR when sessions are getting GC'd before peers come back. Required arg...
Part of the RogerRat server.
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AI agents use update_channel_ttl to create or modify resources in RogerRat. Write operations carry medium risk because an autonomous agent could trigger bulk unintended modifications. Rate limits prevent a single agent session from making hundreds of changes in rapid succession. Argument validation ensures the agent passes expected values.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call update_channel_ttl repeatedly, creating or modifying resources faster than any human could review. PolicyLayer's rate limiting ensures write operations happen at a controlled pace, and argument validation catches malformed or unexpected inputs before they reach RogerRat.
Write tools can modify data. A rate limit prevents runaway bulk operations from AI agents.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"update_channel_ttl": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "update_channel_ttl_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 30,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}See the full RogerRat policy for all 16 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access update_channel_ttl gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other write tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: rate-limit and validate the arguments.
Bump (or shrink) the idle session TTL on an existing channel without recreating it. Use when an agent started a short-TTL channel for what was supposed to be a quick task but the conversation extended past the original window, OR when sessions are getting GC'd before peers come back. Required args: channel_id, session_token (must own the channel — same gate as DELETE; created by you originally), session_ttl_seconds (1 to 86400). Side-effect: new TTL applies on the next GC tick (within 60s). Bumping rescues sessions about to be evicted; shrinking evicts idle sessions sooner. Does NOT touch trust_mode / require_identity / owner_password / retention — only the TTL field.. It is categorised as a Write tool in the RogerRat MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the RogerRat MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for update_channel_ttl: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches RogerRat. Nothing to install.
update_channel_ttl is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the update_channel_ttl rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for update_channel_ttl. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
update_channel_ttl is provided by the RogerRat MCP server (rogerrat). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 16 RogerRat tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
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