Low Risk

search

Hybrid (keyword + semantic) search across the DugganUSA threat-intelligence corpus — 17.9M+ indexed documents. Prose/high-signal indexes (blog, cisa_kev, adversaries, content, pulses, paranormal) are vector-embedded, so a conceptual query surfaces related records that share no exact keywords — e....

Risk signalsAccepts freeform code/query input (query)

Part of the Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP server.

search is read-only, but an agent in a loop can still rack up calls and cost. PolicyLayer caps every call before it runs. Live in minutes.

SECURE JEEVESUS — DUGGANUSA THREAT INTELLIGENCE MCP →

Free to start. No card required.

AI agents call search to retrieve information from Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP without modifying any data. This is common in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows where the agent needs context before taking action. Because read operations don't change state, they are generally safe to allow without restrictions -- but you may still want rate limits to control API costs.

Even though search only reads data, uncontrolled read access can leak sensitive information or rack up API costs. An agent caught in a retry loop could make thousands of calls per minute. A rate limit gives you a safety net without blocking legitimate use.

Read-only tools are safe to allow by default. No rate limit needed unless you want to control costs.

policy.json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "search": {}
  }
}

See the full Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP policy for all 3 tools.

Get this rule live on your own Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP server in minutes. PolicyLayer enforces it on every call, before it runs.

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These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access search gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:

Browse the full MCP Attack Database →

Every attack above starts with a tool call. PolicyLayer checks each one against your policy first, so search only ever does what you allow.

SECURE JEEVESUS — DUGGANUSA THREAT INTELLIGENCE MCP →

Other read tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: allow, with a rate cap to control cost.

What does the search tool do? +

Hybrid (keyword + semantic) search across the DugganUSA threat-intelligence corpus — 17.9M+ indexed documents. Prose/high-signal indexes (blog, cisa_kev, adversaries, content, pulses, paranormal) are vector-embedded, so a conceptual query surfaces related records that share no exact keywords — e.g. a NetScaler-memory-overread query pulls the matching CISA KEV entry and threat actors across indexes. Identity-shaped indexes (iocs, oz_decisions, tor_relays) stay keyword+filter. Public indexes only, read-only, prompt-injection sanitized. Returns up to 25 hits with title, snippet, source, and timestamp. Available indexes: • iocs (1.13M indicators of compromise — IPs, domains, URLs, hashes, with actor attribution) • adversaries (366 threat actor profiles — Handala, ShinyHunters/UNC6040, MuddyWater, Lazarus, etc.) • cisa_kev (1,600+ CVEs in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, daily-synced) • pulses (16K+ OTX community pulses) • blog (1,800+ DugganUSA threat-intel blog posts including our left-of-boom predictions) • epstein_files (400K+ documents from the Epstein archive) • oz_decisions (auto-blocker decisions from our edge — 7.5M+ rows) • paranormal (3,400 fringe-research docs) • tor_relays (1.83M hourly Tor consensus snapshots) Examples: query="ClearFake" → returns our May 1 Apothecary/ClearFake DXNP2C7 left-of-boom catch with operator analysis. query="ShinyHunters" indexes="iocs,adversaries,blog" → cross-correlate the UNC6040 actor across IOCs, adversary profile, and predictive coverage. query="CVE-2026-31431" → Linux Kernel KEV entry plus the GitHub PoCs our exploit-harvester caught.. It is categorised as a Read tool in the Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on search? +

Register the Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for search: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP. Nothing to install.

What risk level is search? +

search is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit search? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the search rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block search completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for search. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides search? +

search is provided by the Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP server (https://analytics.dugganusa.com/api/v1/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

Enforce policy on every Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP tool call.

Deterministic rules across all 3 Jeevesus — DugganUSA Threat Intelligence MCP tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.

Free to start. No card required.

4,600+ MCP servers and 31,000+ tools scanned and risk-classified.

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