session_end
A destructive tool on the Looking Glass MCP server.
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-sahib-sawhney-wh-looking-glass-mcp/session-end.md
What session_end does on Looking Glass
AI agents call session_end to permanently remove resources in Looking Glass, typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
Why session_end is rated Critical
The name 'session_end' strongly implies terminating a browser session, which is typically an irreversible action that destroys session state, cookies, and in-progress work. Given the browser/agent context of this server and sibling tools like 'browser_close' and 'browser_clean_slate', session termination is likely irreversible.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'session_end' — description is empty and uninformative.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs session_end safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Looking Glass, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For session_end, this is the rule to start with:
session_end is removed from the agent's tool list entirely, so the agent never calls it. The rest of the server keeps working.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Looking Glass, apply this rule, and every session_end call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about session_end
session_end is a destructive tool on the Looking Glass MCP server. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Looking Glass MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Looking Glass MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for session_end: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Looking Glass. Nothing to install.
session_end is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the session_end rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for session_end. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
session_end is provided by the Looking Glass MCP server (looking-glass-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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