Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns { sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt } — pass sessionId as the mcp-session-id header on every subsequent MCP request. walletAddress is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tool...
Risk signalsHandles credentials or secrets (apiKey) · Bulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets
Part of the Mcp server.
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AI agents use tronsave_login to create or modify resources in Mcp. Write operations carry medium risk because an autonomous agent could trigger bulk unintended modifications. Rate limits prevent a single agent session from making hundreds of changes in rapid succession. Argument validation ensures the agent passes expected values.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call tronsave_login repeatedly, creating or modifying resources faster than any human could review. PolicyLayer's rate limiting ensures write operations happen at a controlled pace, and argument validation catches malformed or unexpected inputs before they reach Mcp.
Write tools can modify data. A rate limit prevents runaway bulk operations from AI agents.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"tronsave_login": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "tronsave_login_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 30,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
} See the full Mcp policy for all 29 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access tronsave_login gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other write tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: rate-limit and validate the arguments.
Authenticate with TronSave and create a server session. Returns { sessionId, walletAddress?, expiresAt } — pass sessionId as the mcp-session-id header on every subsequent MCP request. walletAddress is set only for signature-mode logins. Two modes: (1) wallet signature (preferred for platform tools) — call this tool with signature_timestamp formatted as <signature>_<timestamp>, where <signature> must be produced client-side by signing the timestamp message; you may optionally call tronsave_get_sign_message to obtain a helper message/timestamp pair; (2) API key (internal tools) — pass apiKey (raw key, no prefix). Side effect: creates a new session on the server. Wallet signing must happen client-side; never send private keys to the server.. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Mcp MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for tronsave_login: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Mcp. Nothing to install.
tronsave_login is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the tronsave_login rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for tronsave_login. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
tronsave_login is provided by the MCP server (https://mcp.tronsave.io/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 29 Mcp tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
4,600+ MCP servers and 31,000+ tools scanned and risk-classified.