Medium Risk

send_todo

Send a formatted todo message to Google Chat space

Part of the Google Chat Integration Server server.

send_todo can modify Google Chat Integration Server data, with no limits today. PolicyLayer puts allow, deny, and rate-limit rules on every call. Live in minutes.

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AI agents use send_todo to create or modify resources in Google Chat Integration Server. Write operations carry medium risk because an autonomous agent could trigger bulk unintended modifications. Rate limits prevent a single agent session from making hundreds of changes in rapid succession. Argument validation ensures the agent passes expected values.

Without a policy, an AI agent could call send_todo repeatedly, creating or modifying resources faster than any human could review. PolicyLayer's rate limiting ensures write operations happen at a controlled pace, and argument validation catches malformed or unexpected inputs before they reach Google Chat Integration Server.

Write tools can modify data. A rate limit prevents runaway bulk operations from AI agents.

policy.json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "send_todo": {
      "limits": [
        {
          "counter": "send_todo_rate",
          "window": "minute",
          "max": 30,
          "scope": "grant"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

See the full Google Chat Integration Server policy for all 3 tools.

Get this rule live on your own Google Chat Integration Server server in minutes. PolicyLayer enforces it on every call, before it runs.

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These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access send_todo gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:

Browse the full MCP Attack Database →

Every attack above starts with a tool call. PolicyLayer checks each one against your policy first, so send_todo only ever does what you allow.

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Other write tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: rate-limit and validate the arguments.

What does the send_todo tool do? +

Send a formatted todo message to Google Chat space. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Google Chat Integration Server MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.

How do I enforce a policy on send_todo? +

Register the Google Chat Integration Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for send_todo: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Google Chat Integration Server. Nothing to install.

What risk level is send_todo? +

send_todo is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.

Can I rate-limit send_todo? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the send_todo rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block send_todo completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for send_todo. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides send_todo? +

send_todo is provided by the Google Chat Integration Server MCP server (rishipradeep-think41/gchat-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

Enforce policy on every Google Chat Integration Server tool call.

Deterministic rules across all 3 Google Chat Integration Server tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.

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4,600+ MCP servers and 31,000+ tools scanned and risk-classified.

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