Manage per-workspace role delegation. Assign, list, or remove access for specific emails (view/comment/edit).
Part of the AgentDrive server.
Free to start. No card required.
AI agents may call drive_roles to permanently remove or destroy resources in AgentDrive. Without a policy, an autonomous agent could delete critical data in a loop with no way to undo the damage. PolicyLayer blocks destructive tools by default and requires explicit human approval before enabling them.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call drive_roles in a loop, permanently destroying resources in AgentDrive. There is no undo for destructive operations. PolicyLayer blocks this tool by default and only allows it when a human explicitly approves the action.
Destructive tools permanently remove data. Block by default. Only enable with explicit approval workflows.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"drive_roles"
]
}See the full AgentDrive policy for all 20 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access drive_roles gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other destructive tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: deny by default, or require human approval.
Manage per-workspace role delegation. Assign, list, or remove access for specific emails (view/comment/edit).. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the AgentDrive MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the AgentDrive MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for drive_roles: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches AgentDrive. Nothing to install.
drive_roles is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the drive_roles rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for drive_roles. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
drive_roles is provided by the AgentDrive MCP server (https://mcp.agentdrive.sh/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 20 AgentDrive tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
4,600+ MCP servers and 31,000+ tools scanned and risk-classified.