Remove a workspace member. Editor role required; owner-tier removals require an owner caller. Sole-owner removal is blocked; promote someone else first. Note: if the workspace visibility is org, removing an explicit member of the same org leaves them with virtual editor access via the org-members...
Part of the Dock server.
Free to start. No card required.
AI agents may call remove_workspace_member to permanently remove or destroy resources in Dock. Without a policy, an autonomous agent could delete critical data in a loop with no way to undo the damage. PolicyLayer blocks destructive tools by default and requires explicit human approval before enabling them.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call remove_workspace_member in a loop, permanently destroying resources in Dock. There is no undo for destructive operations. PolicyLayer blocks this tool by default and only allows it when a human explicitly approves the action.
Destructive tools permanently remove data. Block by default. Only enable with explicit approval workflows.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"remove_workspace_member"
]
}See the full Dock policy for all 64 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access remove_workspace_member gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other destructive tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: deny by default, or require human approval.
Remove a workspace member. Editor role required; owner-tier removals require an owner caller. Sole-owner removal is blocked; promote someone else first. Note: if the workspace visibility is org, removing an explicit member of the same org leaves them with virtual editor access via the org-membership branch. Consent-gated for agents: the FIRST call returns { status: 'confirmation_required', confirm_token, message, expires_in }. Surface the message to your user and, if they say yes, re-call this tool within 60s with confirm_token set to the same token. User callers (cookie session) skip the consent step.. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Dock MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Dock MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for remove_workspace_member: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Dock. Nothing to install.
remove_workspace_member is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the remove_workspace_member rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for remove_workspace_member. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
remove_workspace_member is provided by the Dock MCP server (https://trydock.ai/api/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 64 Dock tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
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