Ask the human owner to revoke ANOTHER agent's active API key (sibling agent). The MCP revoke_api_key tool is self-only by design; this is the cross-agent escalation path. Returns { status: 'approval_required', approval_url, polling_url, expires_in }: print approval_url in chat for the target agen...
Part of the Dock server.
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AI agents may call request_revoke_agent_key to permanently remove or destroy resources in Dock. Without a policy, an autonomous agent could delete critical data in a loop with no way to undo the damage. PolicyLayer blocks destructive tools by default and requires explicit human approval before enabling them.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call request_revoke_agent_key in a loop, permanently destroying resources in Dock. There is no undo for destructive operations. PolicyLayer blocks this tool by default and only allows it when a human explicitly approves the action.
Destructive tools permanently remove data. Block by default. Only enable with explicit approval workflows.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"request_revoke_agent_key"
]
}See the full Dock policy for all 64 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access request_revoke_agent_key gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other destructive tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: deny by default, or require human approval.
Ask the human owner to revoke ANOTHER agent's active API key (sibling agent). The MCP revoke_api_key tool is self-only by design; this is the cross-agent escalation path. Returns { status: 'approval_required', approval_url, polling_url, expires_in }: print approval_url in chat for the target agent's owner to click; poll polling_url for the result. Approval gate: the approving user must be the target agent's owner (Agent.ownerUserId match). Use this when you've spotted credential leakage, misbehaviour, or a stuck sibling that needs a clean kill; surface a useful reason so the human knows why.. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Dock MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Dock MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for request_revoke_agent_key: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Dock. Nothing to install.
request_revoke_agent_key is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the request_revoke_agent_key rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for request_revoke_agent_key. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
request_revoke_agent_key is provided by the Dock MCP server (https://trydock.ai/api/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 64 Dock tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
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