Transfer learned patterns from another project Use when native Bash hooks (via Claude Code\
AI agents use hooks_transfer to commit financial operations through Claude Flow — usually the final step of a payment, billing, or trading workflow. A call moves real money.
hooks_transfer moves real money, and an autonomous agent will call it with the same confidence it calls a search tool. A misread instruction or an injected prompt is all it takes to drain an account or blow a budget.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Transfer learned patterns from another project Use when native Bash hooks (via Claude Code\. It is categorised as a Financial tool in the Claude Flow MCP Server, which means it involves financial transactions. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Claude Flow MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for hooks_transfer: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Claude Flow. Nothing to install.
hooks_transfer is a Financial tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the hooks_transfer rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for hooks_transfer. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
hooks_transfer is provided by the Claude Flow MCP server (claude-flow). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.