[cost: free (pure CPU, no network) | read-only] Use this when the user asks 'review my config' or attaches a kamailio.cfg, sip.conf, pjsip.conf, FreeSWITCH XML profile, opensips.cfg, or a SIP-shaped source file from a repo. This tool: 1. Detects the vendor from filename + structural signatures (l...
Part of the SIPFlow server.
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AI agents may call review_sip_config to permanently remove or destroy resources in SIPFlow. Without a policy, an autonomous agent could delete critical data in a loop with no way to undo the damage. PolicyLayer blocks destructive tools by default and requires explicit human approval before enabling them.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call review_sip_config in a loop, permanently destroying resources in SIPFlow. There is no undo for destructive operations. PolicyLayer blocks this tool by default and only allows it when a human explicitly approves the action.
Destructive tools permanently remove data. Block by default. Only enable with explicit approval workflows.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"review_sip_config"
]
}See the full SIPFlow policy for all 21 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access review_sip_config gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other destructive tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: deny by default, or require human approval.
[cost: free (pure CPU, no network) | read-only] Use this when the user asks 'review my config' or attaches a kamailio.cfg, sip.conf, pjsip.conf, FreeSWITCH XML profile, opensips.cfg, or a SIP-shaped source file from a repo. This tool: 1. Detects the vendor from filename + structural signatures (loadmodule, route blocks, [transport-*] sections, <profile name=>, KEMI calls). 2. Extracts a structured outline: loaded modules, modparams, listen lines, route blocks, profiles, gateways, dialplan extensions. 3. Surfaces risk flags - e.g. websocket loaded without TLS, nathelper without rtpengine, chan_sip used in modern Asterisk, AND the Kamailio/OpenSIPS lump-vs-subst race (subst('/^From:.../...') colliding with KSR.hdr.append/remove or uac_replace_* or append_hf/remove_hf on the same header - corrupts the buffer at serialization). 4. Returns a list of suggestedQueries for search_sip_docs so you can ground the actual review in vendor docs. Pair with: one or more search_sip_docs calls (cite returned source_url values verbatim instead of recalling vendor behavior from memory); webrtc_sip_checklist when the config is a WebRTC ↔ SIP bridge.. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the SIPFlow MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the SIPFlow MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for review_sip_config: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches SIPFlow. Nothing to install.
review_sip_config is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the review_sip_config rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for review_sip_config. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
review_sip_config is provided by the SIPFlow MCP server (sipflow/sipflow). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 21 SIPFlow tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
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