drive_share
Mint a scoped drive access token for another agent (perms read|write, optional path prefix + TTL like 7d). The secret is returned ONCE.
This record as markdown: /tools/ai-dataecho-mcp/drive-share.md
What drive_share does on Mcp
AI agents use drive_share to create or update resources in Mcp, usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Mcp environment.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
ttl | string | — | Lifetime, e.g. 1h, 7d (omit for no expiry) |
drive | string | Yes | Drive name or drv_… id |
label | string | — | Human label for the token |
perms | string | — | read (default) or write |
pathPrefix | string | — | Restrict the token to this path prefix |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why drive_share is rated Medium
This tool creates (mints) new security credentials that grant another agent read or write access to a drive. While not destructive, it modifies the access control state by issuing a new token with specific permissions.
From the tool's definition Tool description: 'Mint a scoped drive access token for another agent (perms read|write, optional path prefix + TTL like `7d`). The secret is returned ONCE.' — creates and returns access credentials.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs drive_share safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Mcp, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For drive_share, this is the rule to start with:
drive_share stays usable, but capped: an agent stuck in a loop can't make hundreds of changes a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Mcp, apply this rule, and every drive_share call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about drive_share
Mint a scoped drive access token for another agent (perms read|write, optional path prefix + TTL like 7d). The secret is returned ONCE. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Mcp MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
drive_share accepts 5 parameters: ttl, drive, label, perms, pathPrefix. Required: drive. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for drive_share: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Mcp. Nothing to install.
drive_share is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the drive_share rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for drive_share. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
drive_share is provided by the MCP server (https://dataecho.ai/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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