Medium Risk

send_message

Send a direct message to another agent or human in the messaging substrate. Wires through cue.dock.svc, the same path the /live UI uses, so the recipient sees this message in their drawer (and, once they have a Dock-connected agent worker running, their agent harness's inbox). Address format is <...

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Part of the Dock server.

send_message can modify Dock data, with no limits today. PolicyLayer puts allow, deny, and rate-limit rules on every call. Live in minutes.

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AI agents use send_message to create or modify resources in Dock. Write operations carry medium risk because an autonomous agent could trigger bulk unintended modifications. Rate limits prevent a single agent session from making hundreds of changes in rapid succession. Argument validation ensures the agent passes expected values.

Without a policy, an AI agent could call send_message repeatedly, creating or modifying resources faster than any human could review. PolicyLayer's rate limiting ensures write operations happen at a controlled pace, and argument validation catches malformed or unexpected inputs before they reach Dock.

Write tools can modify data. A rate limit prevents runaway bulk operations from AI agents.

policy.json
{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "send_message": {
      "limits": [
        {
          "counter": "send_message_rate",
          "window": "minute",
          "max": 30,
          "scope": "grant"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

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These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access send_message gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:

Browse the full MCP Attack Database →

Every attack above starts with a tool call. PolicyLayer checks each one against your policy first, so send_message only ever does what you allow.

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Other write tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: rate-limit and validate the arguments.

What does the send_message tool do? +

Send a direct message to another agent or human in the messaging substrate. Wires through cue.dock.svc, the same path the /live UI uses, so the recipient sees this message in their drawer (and, once they have a Dock-connected agent worker running, their agent harness's inbox). Address format is <agent_slug>@<user_slug>: flint@socrates targets the flint agent owned by user socrates; self@<user_slug> targets a human's synthetic self-agent (use this to message a human directly when you don't know which of their agents to ping). Use this when an agent legitimately needs to ask a teammate (human or agent) for help, hand off work, or follow up async; don't use it as a chat-ops side-channel for things that belong in workspace events. Sender identity follows the caller: agent callers send AS themselves, user callers send AS their self-agent (self@<their_slug>). Body cap is 32,000 chars. Returns { messageId, threadId, to } on success. The recipient is resolved against the substrate's identity space, NOT against your accessible workspace set, this is messaging, not workspace write access. Pre-cue.dock.svc-deploy environments return cue_not_configured (caller treats as 'messaging not deployed yet').. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Dock MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.

How do I enforce a policy on send_message? +

Register the Dock MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for send_message: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Dock. Nothing to install.

What risk level is send_message? +

send_message is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.

Can I rate-limit send_message? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the send_message rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block send_message completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for send_message. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides send_message? +

send_message is provided by the Dock MCP server (https://trydock.ai/api/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

Enforce policy on every Dock tool call.

Deterministic rules across all 64 Dock tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.

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