Rename a workspace, change its slug, switch its default-view mode, or flip its visibility (private | org | unlisted | public). Pass any subset of name, new_slug, mode, visibility; fields you omit are left unchanged. Slug renames preserve old URLs via WorkspaceSlugAlias so previously-shared links ...
Risk signalsBulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets
Part of the Dock server.
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AI agents use update_workspace to create or modify resources in Dock. Write operations carry medium risk because an autonomous agent could trigger bulk unintended modifications. Rate limits prevent a single agent session from making hundreds of changes in rapid succession. Argument validation ensures the agent passes expected values.
Without a policy, an AI agent could call update_workspace repeatedly, creating or modifying resources faster than any human could review. PolicyLayer's rate limiting ensures write operations happen at a controlled pace, and argument validation catches malformed or unexpected inputs before they reach Dock.
Write tools can modify data. A rate limit prevents runaway bulk operations from AI agents.
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"update_workspace": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "update_workspace_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 30,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
}See the full Dock policy for all 64 tools.
These attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access update_workspace gives an agent. Each links to the full case and the policy that stops it:
Other write tools across the catalogue. The same approach applies to each: rate-limit and validate the arguments.
Rename a workspace, change its slug, switch its default-view mode, or flip its visibility (private | org | unlisted | public). Pass any subset of name, new_slug, mode, visibility; fields you omit are left unchanged. Slug renames preserve old URLs via WorkspaceSlugAlias so previously-shared links keep resolving. Visibility flips disconnect every live SSE subscriber so reconnects re-authenticate against the new visibility. Editor role required. Emits workspace.renamed and/or workspace.visibility_changed. Visibility WIDENING (private → org/unlisted/public, org → unlisted/public, unlisted → public) is consent-gated: pass consent_mode: "web" to return an approval_url the user clicks; otherwise the call returns consent_required and you must re-issue with consent_mode set. Visibility narrowing + non-visibility updates execute immediately on the agent's role.. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Dock MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
Register the Dock MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for update_workspace: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Dock. Nothing to install.
update_workspace is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the update_workspace rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for update_workspace. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
update_workspace is provided by the Dock MCP server (https://trydock.ai/api/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Deterministic rules across all 64 Dock tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.
Free to start. No card required.
4,600+ MCP servers and 31,000+ tools scanned and risk-classified.