runtime_inject_input
Inject a synthetic input event for automated play-testing. DESTRUCTIVE. event.kind is 'action' | 'key' | 'mouse_button' | 'mouse_motion'. Example: {"kind":"action","action":"jump","pressed":true}.
This record as markdown: /tools/breakpoint-mcp/runtime-inject-input.md
What runtime_inject_input does on Breakpoint
AI agents invoke runtime_inject_input to trigger actions in Breakpoint. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
peer | string | — | Target a headless peer by id (from runtime_spawn_peers). Omit to address the default running game. |
event | object | Yes | |
confirm | boolean | — | Auto-approve this destructive action (skip the confirmation prompt) |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why runtime_inject_input is rated High
This tool injects synthetic input events into a running runtime, triggering external operations whose effects depend on the arguments passed. While labeled DESTRUCTIVE by the server, the primary risk is executing arbitrary input sequences that could drive the application into unintended states, trigger in-game actions, or cause side effects — this maps best to Execute.
From the tool's definition "Inject a synthetic input event for automated play-testing. DESTRUCTIVE." and event kinds including 'action', 'key', 'mouse_button', 'mouse_motion'
Risk signalsHigh parameter count (11 properties)
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs runtime_inject_input safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Breakpoint, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For runtime_inject_input, this is the rule to start with:
runtime_inject_input stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Breakpoint, apply this rule, and every runtime_inject_input call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about runtime_inject_input
Inject a synthetic input event for automated play-testing. DESTRUCTIVE. event.kind is 'action' | 'key' | 'mouse_button' | 'mouse_motion'. Example: {"kind":"action","action":"jump","pressed":true}. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Breakpoint MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
runtime_inject_input accepts 3 parameters: peer, event, confirm. Required: event. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Breakpoint MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for runtime_inject_input: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Breakpoint. Nothing to install.
runtime_inject_input is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the runtime_inject_input rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for runtime_inject_input. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
runtime_inject_input is provided by the Breakpoint MCP server (breakpoint-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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