set_capability_profile
[SUPPORT] 02038afe — Persist ONE layer of the capability-inheritance chain: workspace -> user -> project -> sprint_version -> item (least to most specific). scope_type selects the layer; scope_id is that layer's key (a tenant/workspace id for 'workspace', a user/human id for 'user', the project_i...
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-ajc3xc-meridian/set-capability-profile.md
What set_capability_profile does on Meridian
AI agents use set_capability_profile to create or update resources in Meridian, usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Meridian environment.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
scope_id | string | Yes | The key for this layer — see the tool description for what goes here per scope_type. |
provenance | object | — | Non-secret provenance for this layer's declaration (config source, hashes, observed_at, client/server identity, fallback policy). No secrets or machine-local ab |
scope_type | string | Yes | |
capabilities | array | — | This layer's capability declarations — replaces whatever is currently stored at this scope. |
disabled_capability_ids | array | — | Capability ids to retract at this scope even though a less specific layer declared them. Replaces this scope's previous disable list. |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why set_capability_profile is rated Medium
An AI agent can call set_capability_profile faster than any human can review: one bad instruction and it creates or modifies resources in Meridian by the hundred, each call as confident as the last.
Risk signalsHigh parameter count (12 properties)
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs set_capability_profile safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Meridian, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For set_capability_profile, this is the rule to start with:
set_capability_profile stays usable, but capped: an agent stuck in a loop can't make hundreds of changes a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Meridian, apply this rule, and every set_capability_profile call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about set_capability_profile
[SUPPORT] 02038afe — Persist ONE layer of the capability-inheritance chain: workspace -> user -> project -> sprint_version -> item (least to most specific). scope_type selects the layer; scope_id is that layer's key (a tenant/workspace id for 'workspace', a user/human id for 'user', the project_id for 'project', the sprint item's id for 'item', or the project_id for 'sprint_version' — the sprint version itself is resolved from whichever sprint item you query via get_effective_capability_profile). capabilities uses the exact same schema as set_capability_manifest and REPLACES this scope's capabilities wholesale (not a merge). disabled_capability_ids explicitly retracts capability ids this scope inherited from a less specific layer, without redeclaring them — that list also REPLACES whatever was previously disabled at this scope. provenance is an optional object recording non-secret context (e.g. config source label, a config/tool-list hash, observed_at, client/server identity, fallback policy) — never raw secrets or machine-local absolute paths, rejected the same way set_capability_manifest rejects them. Use clear_capability_profile to remove a scope's row entirely instead of replacing it with an empty one. Persistent-state disclosure: on hosted Meridian, supplied text and project/session metadata -- including task log entries, pinned decisions, sprint items, notes, handoff/goal state, and HITL queue items -- are sent to and stored in Meridian's service, in an isolated per-tenant Postgres database (Neon); self-hosted deployments keep the same categories in the configured local SQLite/Postgres database. This data is visible in the dashboard and API, and may resurface in later project context or handoffs. Notes and pinned decisions can be deleted individually; task log entries and sprint items can be deleted via the dashboard/API (not exposed as an agent-facing tool); HITL queue items and handoff state have no per-record delete. Full removal of any of this data is available via project or account deletion, using the documented controls. Do not include secrets. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Meridian MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
set_capability_profile accepts 5 parameters: scope_id, provenance, scope_type, capabilities, disabled_capability_ids. Required: scope_id, scope_type. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Meridian MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for set_capability_profile: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Meridian. Nothing to install.
set_capability_profile is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the set_capability_profile rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for set_capability_profile. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
set_capability_profile is provided by the Meridian MCP server (@meridianmcp/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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