set_capability_profile
[SUPPORT] 02038afe — Persist ONE layer of the capability-inheritance chain: workspace -> user -> project -> sprint_version -> item (least to most specific). scope_type selects the layer; scope_id is that layer's key (a tenant/workspace id for 'workspace', a user/human id for 'user', the project_i...
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-ajc3xc-meridian/set-capability-profile.md
What set_capability_profile does on Meridian
AI agents use set_capability_profile to create or update resources in Meridian, usually the action step of a workflow, after the agent has gathered context. Every call changes real data in your Meridian environment.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
scope_id | string | Yes | The key for this layer — see the tool description for what goes here per scope_type. |
provenance | object | — | Non-secret provenance for this layer's declaration (config source, hashes, observed_at, client/server identity, fallback policy). No secrets or machine-local ab |
scope_type | string | Yes | |
capabilities | array | — | This layer's capability declarations — replaces whatever is currently stored at this scope. |
disabled_capability_ids | array | — | Capability ids to retract at this scope even though a less specific layer declared them. Replaces this scope's previous disable list. |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why set_capability_profile is rated Medium
This tool creates or modifies capability profiles at various scope levels (workspace, user, project, sprint). It is reversible (capabilities can be updated again), so it qualifies as Write rather than Destructive.
From the tool's definition Tool description states 'Persist ONE layer' and 'REPLACES this scope's capab[ilities]' — indicates modification of configuration data within a capability-inheritance chain across workspace, user, project, and sprint scopes.
Risk signalsHigh parameter count (12 properties)
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs set_capability_profile safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Meridian, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For set_capability_profile, this is the rule to start with:
set_capability_profile stays usable, but capped: an agent stuck in a loop can't make hundreds of changes a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Meridian, apply this rule, and every set_capability_profile call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about set_capability_profile
[SUPPORT] 02038afe — Persist ONE layer of the capability-inheritance chain: workspace -> user -> project -> sprint_version -> item (least to most specific). scope_type selects the layer; scope_id is that layer's key (a tenant/workspace id for 'workspace', a user/human id for 'user', the project_id for 'project', the sprint item's id for 'item', or the project_id for 'sprint_version' — the sprint version itself is resolved from whichever sprint item you query via get_effective_capability_profile). capabilities uses the exact same schema as set_capability_manifest and REPLACES this scope's capabilities wholesale (not a merge). disabled_capability_ids explicitly retracts capability ids this scope inherited from a less specific layer, without redeclaring them — that list also REPLACES whatever was previously disabled at this scope. provenance is an optional object recording non-secret context (e.g. config source label, a config/tool-list hash, observed_at, client/server identity, fallback policy) — never raw secrets or machine-local absolute paths, rejected the same way set_capability_manifest rejects them. Use clear_capability_profile to remove a scope's row entirely instead of replacing it with an empty one. Persistent-state disclosure: on hosted Meridian, supplied text and project/session metadata are sent to and stored in Meridian's service; self-hosted deployments keep them in the configured local SQLite/Postgres database. This data is visible in the dashboard/API and later project context or handoffs. Delete individual tasks, notes, or decisions where supported, or delete the project/account using the documented controls. Do not include secrets. It is categorised as a Write tool in the Meridian MCP Server, which means it can create or modify data. Consider rate limits to prevent runaway writes.
set_capability_profile accepts 5 parameters: scope_id, provenance, scope_type, capabilities, disabled_capability_ids. Required: scope_id, scope_type. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Meridian MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for set_capability_profile: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Meridian. Nothing to install.
set_capability_profile is a Write tool with medium risk. Write tools should be rate-limited to prevent accidental bulk modifications.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the set_capability_profile rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for set_capability_profile. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
set_capability_profile is provided by the Meridian MCP server (@meridianmcp/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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