browse_library

SERVERtdmcp — TouchDesigner MCP server SOURCE@dpantani/tdmcp

Low RISK CLASS

Category Read

Parameters 00 required

Recommended Allowedsee the rule below

Registry record Grade F, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-pantani-tdmcp/browse-library.md

WHAT IT DOES

What browse_library does on tdmcp — TouchDesigner MCP server

AI agents call browse_library to retrieve information from tdmcp — TouchDesigner MCP server without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.

RISK

Why browse_library is rated Low

This tool only retrieves and queries available recipes and component packages from TouchDesigner's library. It has no side effects, creates no data, executes no operations, and cannot delete or modify anything. It is purely informational/discovery functionality that precedes actual modifications (apply_recipe, install_library_package). The 'Read-only' designation in the description confirms this classification.

From the tool's definition Tool description explicitly states 'Read-only discovery step' and 'Browse built-in/vault recipes'. Returns matching recipes and packages for selection without modifying any state.

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

RECOMMENDED RULE

The rule that runs browse_library safely

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and tdmcp — TouchDesigner MCP server, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For browse_library, this is the rule to start with:

browse_library Allowed

browse_library is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "browse_library": {}
  }
}

ALLOW ONLY THIS TOOL → Instant setup, no code required.

The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect tdmcp — TouchDesigner MCP server, apply this rule, and every browse_library call is checked against it from then on.

FAQ

Questions about browse_library

What does the browse_library tool do? +

Browse built-in/vault recipes and optional local component packages. Read-only discovery step before instantiating a recipe (apply_recipe) or installing a package (install_library_package); returns the matching recipes and packages so an agent can pick one by name. It is categorised as a Read tool in the tdmcp — TouchDesigner MCP server MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on browse_library? +

Register the tdmcp — TouchDesigner MCP server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browse_library: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches tdmcp — TouchDesigner MCP server. Nothing to install.

What risk level is browse_library? +

browse_library is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit browse_library? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browse_library rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block browse_library completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browse_library. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides browse_library? +

browse_library is provided by the tdmcp — TouchDesigner MCP server MCP server (@dpantani/tdmcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

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