browser_drag
A execute tool on the Looking Glass MCP server.
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-sahib-sawhney-wh-looking-glass-mcp/browser-drag.md
What browser_drag does on Looking Glass
AI agents invoke browser_drag to trigger actions in Looking Glass. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
sourceSelector | string | Yes | CSS selector of drag source |
targetSelector | string | Yes | CSS selector of drop target |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why browser_drag is rated High
Based on the name, this tool likely performs a drag-and-drop browser action, which is an Execute-category operation (triggering external browser interactions). The empty description lowers confidence. Given the sibling tools context (browser automation server), drag actions can trigger UI workflows with unpredictable side effects, warranting high severity.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'browser_drag' suggests a browser drag-and-drop interaction; description is empty and uninformative.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs browser_drag safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Looking Glass, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For browser_drag, this is the rule to start with:
browser_drag stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Looking Glass, apply this rule, and every browser_drag call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about browser_drag
browser_drag is a execute tool on the Looking Glass MCP server. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Looking Glass MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
browser_drag accepts 2 parameters: sourceSelector, targetSelector. Required: sourceSelector, targetSelector. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Looking Glass MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_drag: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Looking Glass. Nothing to install.
browser_drag is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_drag rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_drag. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
browser_drag is provided by the Looking Glass MCP server (looking-glass-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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