browser_tab_select
A execute tool on the Looking Glass MCP server.
This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-sahib-sawhney-wh-looking-glass-mcp/browser-tab-select.md
What browser_tab_select does on Looking Glass
AI agents invoke browser_tab_select to trigger actions in Looking Glass. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
tabId | string | Yes | Tab ID to switch to (first 8 chars or full UUID) |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why browser_tab_select is rated High
Based on the tool name and context of sibling tools (browser_click, browser_action_history, etc.), this tool likely selects or switches between browser tabs, constituting a browser execution action. Empty description lowers confidence. Severity is medium as tab switching could redirect agent context to unintended pages.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'browser_tab_select' suggests switching/selecting a browser tab, which is a browser action/navigation operation. Description is empty and uninformative.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs browser_tab_select safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Looking Glass, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For browser_tab_select, this is the rule to start with:
browser_tab_select stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Looking Glass, apply this rule, and every browser_tab_select call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about browser_tab_select
browser_tab_select is a execute tool on the Looking Glass MCP server. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Looking Glass MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
browser_tab_select accepts 1 parameter: tabId. Required: tabId. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Looking Glass MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_tab_select: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Looking Glass. Nothing to install.
browser_tab_select is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_tab_select rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_tab_select. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
browser_tab_select is provided by the Looking Glass MCP server (looking-glass-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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