unifi_toggle_device

A execute tool on the UniFi Access MCP server.

SERVERUniFi Access MCP SOURCEpypi:unifi-protect-mcp

High RISK CLASS

Category Execute

Parameters 00 required

Recommended Rate-limitedsee the rule below

Registry record Grade F, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/io-github-sirkirby-unifi-access-mcp/unifi-toggle-device.md

WHAT IT DOES

What unifi_toggle_device does on UniFi Access MCP

AI agents invoke unifi_toggle_device to trigger actions in UniFi Access MCP. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.

RISK

Why unifi_toggle_device is rated High

The name suggests toggling a UniFi Access device (e.g., door lock/unlock or enabling/disabling a device), which constitutes executing an external physical operation. This could affect physical security (e.g., unlocking doors). However, the empty description lowers confidence.

From the tool's definition Tool name 'unifi_toggle_device' implies triggering a state change on a physical device; description is empty and uninformative.

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

RECOMMENDED RULE

The rule that runs unifi_toggle_device safely

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and UniFi Access MCP, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For unifi_toggle_device, this is the rule to start with:

unifi_toggle_device Rate-limited

unifi_toggle_device stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "unifi_toggle_device": {
      "limits": [
        {
          "counter": "unifi_toggle_device_rate",
          "window": "minute",
          "max": 10,
          "scope": "grant"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}

RATE-LIMIT THIS TOOL → Instant setup, no code required.

The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect UniFi Access MCP, apply this rule, and every unifi_toggle_device call is checked against it from then on.

FAQ

Questions about unifi_toggle_device

What does the unifi_toggle_device tool do? +

unifi_toggle_device is a execute tool on the UniFi Access MCP server. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the UniFi Access MCP MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.

How do I enforce a policy on unifi_toggle_device? +

Register the UniFi Access MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for unifi_toggle_device: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches UniFi Access MCP. Nothing to install.

What risk level is unifi_toggle_device? +

unifi_toggle_device is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.

Can I rate-limit unifi_toggle_device? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the unifi_toggle_device rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block unifi_toggle_device completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for unifi_toggle_device. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides unifi_toggle_device? +

unifi_toggle_device is provided by the UniFi Access MCP server (pypi:unifi-protect-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

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