Sign a revocation for a previously-published attestation. The revocation is added to /.well-known/crow-identity-revocations.json and the original attestation is marked revoked (but retained in the DB for audit). Rotating an app key should automatically chain revoke → attest; expose that via the b...
AI agents call crow_identity_revoke to permanently remove resources in Crow — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
Revoking an attestation is an irreversible action — while the record is retained in the DB for audit, the revocation itself cannot be undone and permanently invalidates a previously-published cryptographic attestation. This is destructive in nature.
From the tool's definition Sign a revocation for a previously-published attestation... the original attestation is marked revoked
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access crow_identity_revoke gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Crow, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for crow_identity_revoke:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"crow_identity_revoke"
]
} crow_identity_revoke disappears from the agent's tool list entirely, and any attempt to call it is denied. The rest of the server keeps working.
Free to start. No card required.
Sign a revocation for a previously-published attestation. The revocation is added to /.well-known/crow-identity-revocations.json and the original attestation is marked revoked (but retained in the DB for audit). Rotating an app key should automatically chain revoke → attest; expose that via the bundle. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Crow MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Crow MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for crow_identity_revoke: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Crow. Nothing to install.
crow_identity_revoke is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the crow_identity_revoke rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for crow_identity_revoke. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
crow_identity_revoke is provided by the Crow MCP server (kh0pper/crow). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Crow, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
576 Crow tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.