crow_identity_revoke
Sign a revocation for a previously-published attestation. The revocation is added to /.well-known/crow-identity-revocations.json and the original attestation is marked revoked (but retained in the DB for audit). Rotating an app key should automatically chain revoke → attest; expose that via the b...
This record as markdown: /tools/kh0pper-crow/crow-identity-revoke.md
What crow_identity_revoke does on Crow
AI agents call crow_identity_revoke to permanently remove resources in Crow, typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
Why crow_identity_revoke is rated Critical
Revoking an attestation is an irreversible action — once a revocation is signed and published, the original attestation is permanently invalidated. While the original record is retained for audit, the revocation itself cannot be undone, and misuse could break trust chains, disable authentication, or disrupt federated identity across platforms.
From the tool's definition Sign a revocation for a previously-published attestation. The revocation is added to /.well-known/crow-identity-revocations.json and the original attestation is marked revoked
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs crow_identity_revoke safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Crow, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For crow_identity_revoke, this is the rule to start with:
crow_identity_revoke is removed from the agent's tool list entirely, so the agent never calls it. The rest of the server keeps working.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Crow, apply this rule, and every crow_identity_revoke call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about crow_identity_revoke
Sign a revocation for a previously-published attestation. The revocation is added to /.well-known/crow-identity-revocations.json and the original attestation is marked revoked (but retained in the DB for audit). Rotating an app key should automatically chain revoke → attest; expose that via the bundle. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Crow MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Crow MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for crow_identity_revoke: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Crow. Nothing to install.
crow_identity_revoke is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the crow_identity_revoke rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for crow_identity_revoke. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
crow_identity_revoke is provided by the Crow MCP server (kh0pper/crow). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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