config_reset
Reset configuration to defaults Use when native settings.json edits are wrong because the values need to be read by the Ruflo runtime (daemon, MCP server, neural router) — those load via the config_* path, not by re-reading settings.json. For .gitignore / .editorconfig style files, native Edit is...
This record as markdown: /tools/ruflo/config-reset.md
What config_reset does on Ruflo
AI agents call config_reset to permanently remove resources in Ruflo, typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
Why config_reset is rated Critical
Resetting configuration to defaults irreversibly overwrites existing configuration state. Any custom settings, tuned parameters, or runtime configurations would be lost and cannot be recovered without prior backup. The description explicitly warns about use cases where values must be read by the Ruflo runtime (daemon, MCP server, neural router), indicating this affects critical system components.
From the tool's definition Reset configuration to defaults
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs config_reset safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Ruflo, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For config_reset, this is the rule to start with:
config_reset is removed from the agent's tool list entirely, so the agent never calls it. The rest of the server keeps working.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Ruflo, apply this rule, and every config_reset call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about config_reset
Reset configuration to defaults Use when native settings.json edits are wrong because the values need to be read by the Ruflo runtime (daemon, MCP server, neural router) — those load via the config_* path, not by re-reading settings.json. For .gitignore / .editorconfig style files, native Edit is fine. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Ruflo MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Ruflo MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for config_reset: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Ruflo. Nothing to install.
config_reset is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the config_reset rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for config_reset. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
config_reset is provided by the Ruflo MCP server (ruvnet/ruflo). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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