Legacy/emergency only: send all tasks from a task list to a tmux window after a human explicitly chooses tmux delivery. Normal pending-task routing should use task-created headless workflows. Supports filtering, dry-run, and scheduled sending.
AI agents invoke dispatch_task_list to trigger actions in Todos. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
This tool dispatches tasks to a tmux window, triggering external execution of commands/workflows. Sending tasks to tmux implies executing shell-level operations in a terminal session. The 'send all tasks' scope combined with tmux execution makes misuse high-severity, as an AI agent could trigger broad unintended command execution. Dry-run support confirms real execution is the primary mode.
From the tool's definition "send all tasks from a task list to a tmux window" and "Supports filtering, dry-run, and scheduled sending"
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
Legacy/emergency only: send all tasks from a task list to a tmux window after a human explicitly chooses tmux delivery. Normal pending-task routing should use task-created headless workflows. Supports filtering, dry-run, and scheduled sending. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Todos MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Todos MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for dispatch_task_list: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Todos. Nothing to install.
dispatch_task_list is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the dispatch_task_list rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for dispatch_task_list. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
dispatch_task_list is provided by the Todos MCP server (@hasna/todos). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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