// SCAN REPORT

Mcp Google Calendar

19 tools. 11 can modify or destroy data without limits.

2 destructive tools with no built-in limits. Policy required.

Last updated: 4 Oct 2026

11 can modify or destroy data

8 read-only

19 tools total

Community server · catalogue entry checked 20/09/2026 · full schemas captured for 14 of 19 tools

How to control Mcp Google Calendar ↓

TOOL MAP

What Mcp Google Calendar exposes to your agents

Read (8) Write / Execute (9) Destructive / Financial (2)

Running more than one server? Check your whole stack →

CONTEXT-WINDOW COST

What Mcp Google Calendar costs in tokens

7,511 tokens of tool definitions, loaded on every request

3.8% of a 200k context window

1,227 heaviest tool: update_event

Full per-tool breakdown → Model it in the token calculator →

MOST DANGEROUS TOOLS

Critical Risk

The most dangerous Mcp Google Calendar tools

Destructive · Critical delete_event Deletes (cancels) an event — there is no undelete. Deleting a series master id cancels the ENTIRE recurring series; deleting one instance id Destructive · High logout Revokes the stored token at Google (oauth2.googleapis.com/revoke) and deletes the local credentials file. Tokens supplied via env variables Execute · Medium start_login First step of connecting from the chat, without editing config files or restarting the client. Returns authorizeUrl — show it to the user as Write · Medium finish_login Second step: confirms the browser consent finished, saves the tokens to an owner-only file and verifies the login with a read-only identity

11 of Mcp Google Calendar's 19 tools can modify, destroy, or commit something on every call — and an agent calls them with no built-in limits.

POLICY

How to control Mcp Google Calendar

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Mcp Google Calendar, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. These are the rules we recommend:

Deny destructive operations

{
  "delete_event": {
    "deny_if": [
      {
        "conditions": [],
        "on_deny": "Blocked by default. Requires approval."
      }
    ]
  }
}

Destructive tools should never be available to autonomous agents without human approval.

Rate limit write operations

{
  "create_event": {
    "limits": [
      {
        "counter": "create_event_per_hour",
        "window": "hour",
        "max": 30,
        "scope": "grant"
      }
    ]
  }
}

Prevents bulk unintended modifications from agents caught in loops.

Cap read operations

{
  "auth_status": {
    "limits": [
      {
        "counter": "auth_status_per_minute",
        "window": "minute",
        "max": 60,
        "scope": "grant"
      }
    ]
  }
}

Controls API costs and prevents retry loops from exhausting upstream rate limits.

Create a free account and register Mcp Google Calendar — nothing to install.
Add these rules — paste them, or build them visually. Tune the limits to your setup.
Point your MCP client (Claude, Cursor, anything) at your gateway URL.

ENFORCE POLICY ON MCP GOOGLE CALENDAR →

Instant setup, no code required.

FULL CATALOGUE

All 19 Mcp Google Calendar tools

DESTRUCTIVE 2 tools

Destructive delete_event Deletes (cancels) an event — there is no undelete. Deleting a series master id cancels the ENTIRE recurring se Destructive logout Revokes the stored token at Google (oauth2.googleapis.com/revoke) and deletes the local credentials file. Toke

EXECUTE 1 tools

Execute start_login First step of connecting from the chat, without editing config files or restarting the client. Returns authori

WRITE 8 tools

Write create_event Creates an event and returns it (id, htmlLink, start/end, attendees, hangoutLink when add_meet). Times: EITHER Write create_focus_time Creates a Focus Time event: blocks the slot, can auto-decline conflicting invitations (auto_decline + decline_ Write create_out_of_office Creates an Out of Office event that can auto-decline meeting invitations while it lasts (auto_decline: all ove Write finish_login Second step: confirms the browser consent finished, saves the tokens to an owner-only file and verifies the lo Write move_event Moves an event to a different calendar (changes its organizer calendar; the event id stays the same). Reschedu Write set_client Saves the OAuth client credentials from the JSON file downloaded from Google Cloud Console ('Download JSON' on Write setup_instructions Step-by-step checklist for connecting this server to Google: creating a Google Cloud project and a Desktop-app Write update_event Partially updates an event (PATCH): only the provided fields change, but a provided nested object REPLACES its

READ 8 tools

Read auth_status Shows whether this server is connected to Google: token presence and source (env variables or a stored in-chat Read get_calendar Fetches one calendar-list entry: summary, description, timeZone (the calendar's default IANA zone — use it to Read get_event Fetches one event by id: summary, description, location, start/end, attendees with their responseStatus (accep Read list_calendars Lists the calendars on the user's calendar list: id (use it as calendar_id in every other tool), summary, desc Read list_event_instances Expands one recurring event (the series master id) into its individual instances, each with its own id (like m Read list_events Lists events on a calendar: id, summary, start/end (all-day events carry date with an EXCLUSIVE end; timed eve Read query_free_busy Returns the busy intervals of up to 50 calendars in one time window — the way to find a common free slot befor Read raw_request Escape hatch to call any Google Calendar API v3 path directly, for requests the typed tools don't cover — e.g.

EXPLORE

Related servers

Other MCP servers with similar tools — same risk classification, starter policies for each.

FAQ

Questions about Mcp Google Calendar

Can an AI agent delete data through the Mcp Google Calendar MCP server? +

Yes. The Mcp Google Calendar server exposes 2 destructive tools including delete_event, logout. These permanently remove resources with no undo. PolicyLayer blocks destructive tools by default so they never reach the upstream server.

How do I prevent bulk modifications through Mcp Google Calendar? +

The Mcp Google Calendar server has 8 write tools including create_event, create_focus_time, create_out_of_office. Set a rate limit in your policy -- for example, 10 calls per hour prevents an agent from making more than 10 modifications per hour. PolicyLayer enforces this at the gateway, before calls reach Mcp Google Calendar.

How many tools does the Mcp Google Calendar MCP server expose? +

19 tools across 4 categories: Destructive, Execute, Read, Write. 8 are read-only. 11 can modify, create, or delete data.

How do I enforce a policy on Mcp Google Calendar? +

Register the Mcp Google Calendar MCP server in PolicyLayer, apply the suggested rules above (adjust the limits to your use case), and point your AI client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL instead of the server directly. Your agents keep the same tools; PolicyLayer evaluates every call against policy before it executes. Nothing to install, live in minutes.

Enforce policy on every Mcp Google Calendar tool call.

Deterministic rules across all 19 Mcp Google Calendar tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.

ENFORCE POLICY ON MCP GOOGLE CALENDAR →

Instant setup, no code required.

19 Mcp Google Calendar tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 46,500+ MCP servers.

// WHERE THIS COMES FROM

These policies come from Mcp Google Calendar's registry record.

The record behind this page: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, every tool classified, recommended policy — re-checked continuously.

Teams ship this data inside their own products. See what a licence covers →