// SCAN REPORT

Mcp Google Slides

26 tools. 20 can modify or destroy data without limits.

3 destructive tools with no built-in limits. Policy required.

Last updated: 4 Oct 2026

20 can modify or destroy data

6 read-only

26 tools total

Community server · catalogue entry checked 01/09/2026 · full schemas captured for 26 of 26 tools

How to control Mcp Google Slides ↓

TOOL MAP

What Mcp Google Slides exposes to your agents

Read (6) Write / Execute (17) Destructive / Financial (3)

Running more than one server? Check your whole stack →

CONTEXT-WINDOW COST

What Mcp Google Slides costs in tokens

7,827 tokens of tool definitions, loaded on every request

3.9% of a 200k context window

510 heaviest tool: update_text_style

Full per-tool breakdown → Model it in the token calculator →

MOST DANGEROUS TOOLS

Critical Risk

The most dangerous Mcp Google Slides tools

Destructive · High delete_object Irreversibly removes presentation content without undo capability via API. Destructive · High edit_table Irreversibly deletes table cells and restructures data with permanent content loss. Destructive · High manage_comments Delete action permanently removes comment threads and all replies, irreversibly. Execute · High batch_update Executes arbitrary raw API requests covering a wide range of slide modification operations.

20 of Mcp Google Slides's 26 tools can modify, destroy, or commit something on every call — and an agent calls them with no built-in limits.

POLICY

How to control Mcp Google Slides

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Mcp Google Slides, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. These are the rules we recommend:

Deny destructive operations

{
  "delete_object": {
    "deny_if": [
      {
        "conditions": [],
        "on_deny": "Blocked by default. Requires approval."
      }
    ]
  }
}

Destructive tools should never be available to autonomous agents without human approval.

Rate limit write operations

{
  "add_slide": {
    "limits": [
      {
        "counter": "add_slide_per_hour",
        "window": "hour",
        "max": 30,
        "scope": "grant"
      }
    ]
  }
}

Prevents bulk unintended modifications from agents caught in loops.

Cap read operations

{
  "get_page": {
    "limits": [
      {
        "counter": "get_page_per_minute",
        "window": "minute",
        "max": 60,
        "scope": "grant"
      }
    ]
  }
}

Controls API costs and prevents retry loops from exhausting upstream rate limits.

Create a free account and register Mcp Google Slides — nothing to install.
Add these rules — paste them, or build them visually. Tune the limits to your setup.
Point your MCP client (Claude, Cursor, anything) at your gateway URL.

ENFORCE POLICY ON MCP GOOGLE SLIDES →

Instant setup, no code required.

FULL CATALOGUE

All 26 Mcp Google Slides tools

DESTRUCTIVE 3 tools

Destructive delete_object Deletes a slide or a page element (shape, image, table, video, line, group) by object id — batchUpdate deleteO Destructive edit_table Restructures an existing table in one call. action=insert_rows needs row_index (+optional below, default true, Destructive manage_comments Comment threads on the presentation file (served by the Drive API internally — scoped to this one file, no gen

EXECUTE 2 tools

Execute batch_update Sends raw Slides API batchUpdate requests for anything the typed tools don't cover: updateShapeProperties (fil Execute raw_request Escape hatch to call any Google Slides API v1 path directly, for requests even batch_update doesn't cover — e.

WRITE 15 tools

Write add_slide Adds a slide (batchUpdate createSlide) and returns the new slide's objectId in the reply. Pick the look with e Write create_image Inserts an image on a slide (batchUpdate createImage) from EITHER image_url — a public https URL Google's serv Write create_presentation Creates a new Google Slides presentation and returns it (presentationId, revisionId, pageSize, the initial tit Write create_shape Creates a shape on a slide (batchUpdate createShape), optionally with its initial text in the same atomic batc Write create_table Creates an empty rows x columns table on a slide (batchUpdate createTable) and returns its objectId in the rep Write duplicate_slide Duplicates a slide (batchUpdate duplicateObject) — the copy, with all its elements and speaker notes, lands im Write export_presentation Downloads the whole presentation as pdf, pptx, odp or txt (txt = all text incl. speaker notes) and saves it to Write insert_text Inserts text into a shape or a table cell (batchUpdate insertText) at a 0-based character index (default 0 = t Write move_slides Moves one or more slides to a new position (batchUpdate updateSlidesPosition). slide_object_ids must appear in Write replace_image Swaps the bitmap of an existing image element while keeping its frame, position and effects (batchUpdate repla Write replace_text Finds and replaces every occurrence of a string across the whole deck — shapes and table cells on slides, and Write set_speaker_notes Replaces a slide's speaker notes with the given text (empty string clears them). The tool resolves the slide's Write set_text Replaces the ENTIRE text of a shape or table cell: one atomic batch of deleteText(ALL) + insertText. If the ta Write update_text_style Styles the text of a shape or table cell (batchUpdate updateTextStyle): bold, italic, underline, strikethrough Write update_transform Moves and/or scales a page element (batchUpdate updatePageElementTransform). mode=absolute REPLACES the elemen

READ 6 tools

Read get_page Returns one page in full by its object id — works for slides, layouts, masters and notes pages alike. For a sl Read get_presentation Returns the raw presentation JSON: slides[] with every page element (shapes, text runs, tables, images), layou Read get_speaker_notes Returns a slide's speaker notes as plain text, plus the speakerNotesObjectId (the text shape on the slide's hi Read get_thumbnail Renders one page (slide, layout or master) as a PNG. Without output_path it returns contentUrl + width/height Read list_layouts Lists the presentation's theme building blocks: layouts[] (objectId, name like TITLE_AND_BODY, displayName, ma Read list_slides Compact inventory of the deck — the read to start from: presentationId, title, revisionId, pageSizePt, slideCo

EXPLORE

Related servers

Other MCP servers with similar tools — same risk classification, starter policies for each.

FAQ

Questions about Mcp Google Slides

Can an AI agent delete data through the Mcp Google Slides MCP server? +

Yes. The Mcp Google Slides server exposes 3 destructive tools including delete_object, edit_table, manage_comments. These permanently remove resources with no undo. PolicyLayer blocks destructive tools by default so they never reach the upstream server.

How do I prevent bulk modifications through Mcp Google Slides? +

The Mcp Google Slides server has 15 write tools including add_slide, create_image, create_presentation. Set a rate limit in your policy -- for example, 10 calls per hour prevents an agent from making more than 10 modifications per hour. PolicyLayer enforces this at the gateway, before calls reach Mcp Google Slides.

How many tools does the Mcp Google Slides MCP server expose? +

26 tools across 3 categories: Destructive, Read, Write. 6 are read-only. 20 can modify, create, or delete data.

How do I enforce a policy on Mcp Google Slides? +

Register the Mcp Google Slides MCP server in PolicyLayer, apply the suggested rules above (adjust the limits to your use case), and point your AI client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL instead of the server directly. Your agents keep the same tools; PolicyLayer evaluates every call against policy before it executes. Nothing to install, live in minutes.

Enforce policy on every Mcp Google Slides tool call.

Deterministic rules across all 26 Mcp Google Slides tools. Per-identity grants. Full audit log. Live in minutes. Nothing to install.

ENFORCE POLICY ON MCP GOOGLE SLIDES →

Instant setup, no code required.

26 Mcp Google Slides tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 46,500+ MCP servers.

// WHERE THIS COMES FROM

These policies come from Mcp Google Slides's registry record.

The record behind this page: verified identity, auth posture, risk grade, every tool classified, recommended policy — re-checked continuously.

Teams ship this data inside their own products. See what a licence covers →