This record as markdown: /tools/0xyg3n-claude-c2/send-remote-command.md
What send_remote_command does on Claude C2
AI agents invoke send_remote_command to trigger actions in Claude C2. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Why send_remote_command is rated High
This tool sends commands to remote clients, enabling arbitrary code/command execution on external machines. The server context ('command and control of remote systems') and sibling tools (amsi_bypass, bypassuac, browser_creds, defender_exclude) strongly indicate this is a C2 (command-and-control) framework. Misuse could result in full remote system compromise across multiple platforms, making this critical severity.
From the tool's definition 'Send a command to a remote client' — directly executes arbitrary commands on remote systems
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs send_remote_command safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Claude C2, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For send_remote_command, this is the rule to start with:
send_remote_command stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Claude C2, apply this rule, and every send_remote_command call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about send_remote_command
Send a command to a remote client. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Claude C2 MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Claude C2 MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for send_remote_command: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Claude C2. Nothing to install.
send_remote_command is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the send_remote_command rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for send_remote_command. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
send_remote_command is provided by the Claude C2 MCP server (0xyg3n/claude-c2). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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