search_recent

A read tool on the MyChatArchive MCP server.

SERVERMyChatArchive MCP Server SOURCE1ch1n/mychatarchive

Low RISK CLASS

Category Read

Parameters 00 required

Recommended Allowedsee the rule below

Registry record Grade A, identity unverified Pull the record →

This record as markdown: /tools/1ch1n-mychatarchive/search-recent.md

WHAT IT DOES

What search_recent does on MyChatArchive MCP Server

AI agents call search_recent to retrieve information from MyChatArchive MCP Server without modifying anything. It is typically the context-gathering step in research, monitoring, and reporting workflows, before the agent takes action elsewhere.

RISK

Why search_recent is rated Low

Based on the server's stated purpose of enabling search and retrieval across conversation history, 'search_recent' most likely retrieves recent conversation data without modifying it. The absence of a tool description lowers confidence slightly, but the naming convention and server context strongly indicate a Read operation with no side effects or data modification capabilities.

From the tool's definition Tool name 'search_recent' and server description indicating 'semantic search across your local AI conversation history' and 'retrieve context' suggest a query/retrieval operation. No description provided for the specific tool.

Attacks that exploit this kind of access

RECOMMENDED RULE

The rule that runs search_recent safely

PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and MyChatArchive MCP Server, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For search_recent, this is the rule to start with:

search_recent Allowed

search_recent is read-only, so it stays allowed. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.

View as policy code

policy.json

{
  "version": "1",
  "default": "deny",
  "tools": {
    "search_recent": {}
  }
}

ALLOW ONLY THIS TOOL → Instant setup, no code required.

The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect MyChatArchive MCP Server, apply this rule, and every search_recent call is checked against it from then on.

FAQ

Questions about search_recent

What does the search_recent tool do? +

search_recent is a read tool on the MyChatArchive MCP Server MCP server. It is categorised as a Read tool in the MyChatArchive MCP Server MCP Server, which means it retrieves data without modifying state.

How do I enforce a policy on search_recent? +

Register the MyChatArchive MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for search_recent: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches MyChatArchive MCP Server. Nothing to install.

What risk level is search_recent? +

search_recent is a Read tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.

Can I rate-limit search_recent? +

Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the search_recent rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.

How do I block search_recent completely? +

Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for search_recent. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.

What MCP server provides search_recent? +

search_recent is provided by the MyChatArchive MCP Server MCP server (1ch1n/mychatarchive). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.

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