manage_permissions
Manages who can access a file. action=list shows the grants (id, type, role, emailAddress/domain, expirationTime, pendingOwner). action=share grants access: type=user/group (needs email_address), domain (needs domain), or anyone (link sharing; allow_file_discovery=true also makes it searchable); ...
This record as markdown: /tools/a1-x-tech-mcp-google-drive/manage-permissions.md
What manage_permissions does on Mcp Google Drive
AI agents call manage_permissions to permanently remove resources in Mcp Google Drive, typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
role | string | — | share/update: the access level. fileOrganizer/organizer exist only on shared drives; owner transfers ownership. |
type | string | — | share only: who the grant is for. user/group need email_address; domain needs domain; anyone = link sharing. |
action | string | Yes | What to do with the file's permissions. |
domain | string | — | share with type=domain: the Workspace domain, e.g. example.com. |
file_id | string | Yes | The file id — the long id from the Drive URL (drive.google.com/file/d/<fileId> or docs.google.com/.../d/<fileId>/edit) or from search_files/get_file output. Fol |
page_token | string | — | list: nextPageToken from the previous page. |
email_address | string | — | share with type=user/group: the grantee's email address. |
email_message | string | — | share: a custom note for the notification email. |
permission_id | string | — | update/remove: the permission id from action=list. |
expiration_time | string | — | update: RFC3339 expiry for the grant, e.g. 2026-12-31T00:00:00Z (not available for owners). |
transfer_ownership | boolean | — | share with role=owner: confirm the ownership transfer (required by the API for role=owner). |
allow_file_discovery | boolean | — | share with type=domain/anyone: whether the file can be FOUND by search (default false = link only). |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why manage_permissions is rated Critical
An AI agent that decides to call manage_permissions doesn't hesitate, doesn't double-check, and doesn't stop at one. Whatever it removes from Mcp Google Drive is gone. There is no undo for destructive operations.
Risk signalsHigh parameter count (13 properties)
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs manage_permissions safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Mcp Google Drive, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For manage_permissions, this is the rule to start with:
manage_permissions is removed from the agent's tool list entirely, so the agent never calls it. The rest of the server keeps working.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Mcp Google Drive, apply this rule, and every manage_permissions call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about manage_permissions
Manages who can access a file. action=list shows the grants (id, type, role, emailAddress/domain, expirationTime, pendingOwner). action=share grants access: type=user/group (needs email_address), domain (needs domain), or anyone (link sharing; allow_file_discovery=true also makes it searchable); role=reader, commenter, writer, fileOrganizer/organizer (shared drives only) or owner. Sharing with a user emails them by default — send_notification_email=false suppresses it (not allowed for ownership transfers); email_message adds a note. action=update changes an existing grant's role (needs permission_id from list); action=remove revokes it. Ownership transfer: role=owner with transfer_ownership=true — between personal accounts this only INVITES the new owner (pendingOwner until they accept). Changes are live immediately; removing your own access to someone else's file is irreversible from your side. role=owner/organizer grants full control including permanent deletion — prefer writer or less. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Mcp Google Drive MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
manage_permissions accepts 12 parameters: role, type, action, domain, file_id, page_token, email_address, email_message, permission_id, expiration_time, transfer_ownership, allow_file_discovery. Required: action, file_id. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Mcp Google Drive MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for manage_permissions: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Mcp Google Drive. Nothing to install.
manage_permissions is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the manage_permissions rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for manage_permissions. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
manage_permissions is provided by the Mcp Google Drive MCP server (@a1-x-tech/mcp-google-drive). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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