auth_wallet_verify
Step 2: submit the signed challenge. On success returns session_token — a JWT to send as Authorization: Bearer <token> on every subsequent MCP/API request, unlocking the owner-scoped tools (page_claim, create_harness, rig_author, registry_publish, schedules, …). Solana: Ed25519 signature over the...
This record as markdown: /tools/ai-rokha-rokha/auth-wallet-verify.md
What auth_wallet_verify does on Rokha
AI agents invoke auth_wallet_verify to trigger actions in Rokha. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
signature | string | Yes | |
challenge_id | string | Yes | |
wallet_address | string | Yes |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why auth_wallet_verify is rated High
Authenticates and grants elevated access token unlocking destructive/financial privileged operations.
From the tool's definition submit signed challenge, returns session_token JWT unlocking owner-scoped tools
Risk signalsBulk/mass operation — affects multiple targets
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs auth_wallet_verify safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Rokha, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For auth_wallet_verify, this is the rule to start with:
auth_wallet_verify stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Rokha, apply this rule, and every auth_wallet_verify call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about auth_wallet_verify
Step 2: submit the signed challenge. On success returns session_token — a JWT to send as Authorization: Bearer <token> on every subsequent MCP/API request, unlocking the owner-scoped tools (page_claim, create_harness, rig_author, registry_publish, schedules, …). Solana: Ed25519 signature over the raw challenge message bytes (base58 or comma-separated bytes). EVM: EIP-191 personal_sign hex. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Rokha MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
auth_wallet_verify accepts 3 parameters: signature, challenge_id, wallet_address. Required: signature, challenge_id, wallet_address. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Rokha MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for auth_wallet_verify: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Rokha. Nothing to install.
auth_wallet_verify is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the auth_wallet_verify rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for auth_wallet_verify. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
auth_wallet_verify is provided by the Rokha MCP server (https://rokha.ai/mcp/jsonrpc). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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