browser_hover
AI agents invoke browser_hover to trigger actions in Amazon MQ MCP Server. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
Browser interaction tools that perform UI actions like hovering fall under Execute, as they trigger external operations. The empty description reduces confidence significantly. The tool name implies a browser automation action, which could be part of UI automation workflows.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'browser_hover' suggests a browser interaction action (hovering over an element), which is an Execute-category operation. However, the description is empty and uninformative.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
browser_hover. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Amazon MQ MCP Server MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Amazon MQ MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_hover: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Amazon MQ MCP Server. Nothing to install.
browser_hover is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_hover rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_hover. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
browser_hover is provided by the Amazon MQ MCP Server MCP server (awslabs.amazon-mq-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.