finch_push_image
AI agents invoke finch_push_image to trigger actions in Amazon MQ MCP Server. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call — builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
The name suggests pushing a container image (similar to 'docker push'), which is a Write/Execute operation that uploads and potentially overwrites a container image in a registry. However, the description is empty, so confidence is low. Pushing an image can have significant side effects (overwriting existing images, triggering deployments), so severity is rated high.
From the tool's definition Tool name 'finch_push_image' — no description provided.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
finch_push_image. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Amazon MQ MCP Server MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
Register the Amazon MQ MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for finch_push_image: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Amazon MQ MCP Server. Nothing to install.
finch_push_image is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the finch_push_image rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for finch_push_image. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
finch_push_image is provided by the Amazon MQ MCP Server MCP server (awslabs.amazon-mq-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.