AI agents call browser_hover as a supporting operation in Amazon Translate MCP Server workflows.
The description is empty and uninformative, lowering confidence significantly. The tool name 'browser_hover' suggests a browser UI interaction (Execute category), but it is anomalously placed on an Amazon Translate server. Without a description, and given the contextual mismatch, confidence is very low.
From the tool's definition Tool name is 'browser_hover' but description is empty. The name suggests a browser interaction (hovering over an element), which would normally be Execute, but this tool appears completely out of context for an Amazon Translate MCP server.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access browser_hover gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Amazon Translate MCP Server, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for browser_hover:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"tools": {
"browser_hover": {
"limits": [
{
"counter": "browser_hover_rate",
"window": "minute",
"max": 60,
"scope": "grant"
}
]
}
}
} browser_hover gets a rate cap, and everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
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browser_hover. It is categorised as a Other tool in the Amazon Translate MCP Server MCP Server, which means it performs auxiliary operations.
Register the Amazon Translate MCP Server MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for browser_hover: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Amazon Translate MCP Server. Nothing to install.
browser_hover is a Other tool with low risk. Read-only tools are generally safe to allow by default.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the browser_hover rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for browser_hover. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
browser_hover is provided by the Amazon Translate MCP Server MCP server (awslabs.amazon-translate-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Amazon Translate MCP Server, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
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805 Amazon Translate MCP Server tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.