Renounce your own role on a TIP-20 token. This is irreversible unless
AI agents call renounce_role to permanently remove resources in Tempo — typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
Renouncing a role on a token contract is an irreversible administrative action that permanently removes the caller's authority and cannot be recovered without cooperation from other token administrators (if any exist). This fits the Destructive category as it involves permanent loss of access/control.
From the tool's definition Tool description states 'Renounce your own role on a TIP-20 token. This is irreversible unless' - the explicit mention of 'irreversible' combined with renouncing roles (which permanently removes permissions/control) indicates an action that cannot be undone.
Documented attack patterns abuse exactly the kind of access renounce_role gives an agent:
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway — it sits between your AI agents and Tempo, and nothing reaches the server without passing your rules. This is the rule we recommend for renounce_role:
{
"version": "1",
"default": "deny",
"hide": [
"renounce_role"
]
} renounce_role disappears from the agent's tool list entirely, and any attempt to call it is denied. The rest of the server keeps working.
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Renounce your own role on a TIP-20 token. This is irreversible unless. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Tempo MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
Register the Tempo MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for renounce_role: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Tempo. Nothing to install.
renounce_role is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the renounce_role rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for renounce_role. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
renounce_role is provided by the Tempo MCP server (arome3/tempo-mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
Start from Tempo, add the rest of your stack, and see everything your agents can call. Then put policy on all of it.
Free to start. No card required.
61 Tempo tools catalogued and risk-classified — across an index of 43,000+ MCP servers.