This record as markdown: /tools/ca-swiftsign-mcp/swiftsign-void-envelope.md
What swiftsign_void_envelope does on Mcp
AI agents call swiftsign_void_envelope to permanently remove resources in Mcp, typically in cleanup and lifecycle workflows. It does its job in a single call, and there is no undo.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
envelopeId | string | Yes | The envelope ID to void |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why swiftsign_void_envelope is rated Critical
Voiding an envelope is an irreversible action that permanently disables signing capability for a document in flight. Once voided, the envelope cannot be recovered or re-enabled for signing, making this a destructive operation. The high severity reflects the potential business impact of an agent erroneously voiding critical documents, especially since the tool works in both sandbox and live environments.
From the tool's definition Tool description states 'Cancel/void an envelope' and 'Signers can no longer sign a voided envelope.' The word 'void' combined with the irreversible effect of preventing further signing indicates an action that cannot be undone.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs swiftsign_void_envelope safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Mcp, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For swiftsign_void_envelope, this is the rule to start with:
swiftsign_void_envelope is removed from the agent's tool list entirely, so the agent never calls it. The rest of the server keeps working.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Mcp, apply this rule, and every swiftsign_void_envelope call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about swiftsign_void_envelope
Cancel/void an envelope that hasn't been completed yet. Signers can no longer sign a voided envelope. Works in both sandbox (sk_test_ keys) and live. It is categorised as a Destructive tool in the Mcp MCP Server, which means it can permanently delete or destroy data. Block by default and require explicit approval.
swiftsign_void_envelope accepts 1 parameter: envelopeId. Required: envelopeId. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for swiftsign_void_envelope: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Mcp. Nothing to install.
swiftsign_void_envelope is a Destructive tool with critical risk. Critical-risk tools should be blocked by default and only enabled with explicit human approval.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the swiftsign_void_envelope rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for swiftsign_void_envelope. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
swiftsign_void_envelope is provided by the MCP server (https://swiftsign.ca/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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