input.type_text
Type a Unicode string into the currently focused control via native input. Does not click first — focus the field (input.click_target / input.send_actions) before calling. Side effect: keystrokes on the remote desktop. For form fills (click → type → tab/enter), prefer input.send_actions in one call.
This record as markdown: /tools/com-glasswarp-mcp-server/input.type-text.md
What input.type_text does on Glasswarp
AI agents invoke input.type_text to trigger actions in Glasswarp. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
text | string | Yes | Literal text to type (not a key combo) |
session_id | string | Yes | Active session id |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why input.type_text is rated High
This tool executes actions (typing) on a remote system whose effects depend on the argument (the string to type) and the current state of the remote desktop. While typing alone appears benign, in combination with other tools it enables credential entry, command injection into text fields, or manipulation of any application.
From the tool's definition The tool performs keystrokes on a remote Windows PC ('Side effect: keystrokes on the remote desktop'). It takes a Unicode string argument and inputs it into a focused control, which represents direct manipulation of a remote system's input handling.
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs input.type_text safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Glasswarp, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For input.type_text, this is the rule to start with:
input.type_text stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Glasswarp, apply this rule, and every input.type_text call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about input.type_text
Type a Unicode string into the currently focused control via native input. Does not click first — focus the field (input.click_target / input.send_actions) before calling. Side effect: keystrokes on the remote desktop. For form fills (click → type → tab/enter), prefer input.send_actions in one call. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Glasswarp MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
input.type_text accepts 2 parameters: text, session_id. Required: text, session_id. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Glasswarp MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for input.type_text: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Glasswarp. Nothing to install.
input.type_text is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the input.type_text rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for input.type_text. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
input.type_text is provided by the Glasswarp MCP server (https://mcp.glasswarp.com/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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