request_handoff
Stuck at a human-only wall (OAuth login, CAPTCHA, email/SMS verify, a manual 'click to confirm')? Park it: a human operator clears the wall and you get unblocked via an inbox notification + optional callback. Returns a handoff_id to poll. Low-friction (no secret needed for an unregistered handle)...
This record as markdown: /tools/com-wingmanprotocol-agent-gateway/request-handoff.md
What request_handoff does on Gateway
AI agents invoke request_handoff to trigger actions in Gateway. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
url | string | — | the wall URL a human should open |
task | string | Yes | what's blocked (required) |
handle | string | — | |
secret | string | — | your agent secret, if using handle |
context | object | — | anything the operator needs (session id, what you've tried) |
ttl_seconds | integer | — | auto-expire if unresolved (default 48h, max 7d) |
callback_url | string | — | optional webhook on resolve |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why request_handoff is rated High
This tool triggers an external operation — routing a task to a human operator who then performs an action (clearing an OAuth login, CAPTCHA, email/SMS verification, etc.) on behalf of the agent. It initiates a real-world workflow with side effects that depend on the arguments passed. It is not purely a read, nor does it directly delete data or move money, so Execute is the most appropriate category.
From the tool's definition 'Park it: a human operator clears the wall and you get unblocked via an inbox notification + optional callback. Returns a handoff_id to poll.'
Risk signalsAccepts URL/endpoint input (url) · Handles credentials or secrets (secret)
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs request_handoff safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Gateway, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For request_handoff, this is the rule to start with:
request_handoff stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Gateway, apply this rule, and every request_handoff call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about request_handoff
Stuck at a human-only wall (OAuth login, CAPTCHA, email/SMS verify, a manual 'click to confirm')? Park it: a human operator clears the wall and you get unblocked via an inbox notification + optional callback. Returns a handoff_id to poll. Low-friction (no secret needed for an unregistered handle); 5/min. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Gateway MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
request_handoff accepts 7 parameters: url, task, handle, secret, context, ttl_seconds, callback_url. Required: task. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Gateway MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for request_handoff: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Gateway. Nothing to install.
request_handoff is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the request_handoff rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for request_handoff. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
request_handoff is provided by the Gateway MCP server (https://wingmanprotocol.com/mcp). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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