honeypot_manage
Deception: canary tokens, honeyport listeners, trigger detection, canary management
This record as markdown: /tools/defense/honeypot-manage.md
What honeypot_manage does on Defense
AI agents invoke honeypot_manage to trigger actions in Defense. What it does depends on the arguments the agent supplies, and its effects often reach beyond the immediate call: builds kicked off, notifications sent, workflows started.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
port | number | — | Port for honeyport listener |
action | string | Yes | Honeypot/deception action |
canary_id | string | — | ID of canary to remove |
canary_path | string | — | Path for canary deployment |
canary_type | string | — | Type of canary to deploy |
output_format | string | — | Output format |
Parameters from the server's own tool schema.
Why honeypot_manage is rated High
Setting up honeypot listeners and canary tokens involves executing processes that bind to network ports, configure system-level deception mechanisms, and trigger detection workflows. These are active operations with side effects on system networking and security posture. Misuse could open unintended network listeners or disable detection capabilities, hence high severity.
From the tool's definition honeyport listeners, trigger detection, canary management — implies starting/stopping network listeners and configuring active deception infrastructure
Attacks that exploit this kind of access
The rule that runs honeypot_manage safely
PolicyLayer is an MCP gateway: it sits between your AI agents and Defense, and checks every tool call against a rule you set before the call runs. Nothing changes on the server itself. For honeypot_manage, this is the rule to start with:
honeypot_manage stays usable, but rate-capped: a runaway agent can't fire it dozens of times a minute. Everything else on the server is denied unless you say otherwise.
The button opens the PolicyLayer dashboard: create your workspace, connect Defense, apply this rule, and every honeypot_manage call is checked against it from then on.
Questions about honeypot_manage
Deception: canary tokens, honeyport listeners, trigger detection, canary management. It is categorised as a Execute tool in the Defense MCP Server, which means it can trigger actions or run processes. Use rate limits and argument validation.
honeypot_manage accepts 6 parameters: port, action, canary_id, canary_path, canary_type, output_format. Required: action. The full parameter table on this page comes from the server's own tool schema.
Register the Defense MCP server in PolicyLayer and add a rule for honeypot_manage: allow, deny, rate-limit, or require approval. Point your MCP client at the PolicyLayer proxy URL and the rule is enforced on every call, before it reaches Defense. Nothing to install.
honeypot_manage is a Execute tool with high risk. Execute tools should be rate-limited and have argument validation enabled.
Yes. Add a rate_limit block to the honeypot_manage rule in your PolicyLayer policy. For example, setting max: 10 and window: 60 limits the tool to 10 calls per minute. Rate limits are tracked per agent session and reset automatically.
Set action: deny in the PolicyLayer policy for honeypot_manage. The AI agent will receive a policy violation error and cannot call the tool. You can also include a reason field to explain why the tool is blocked.
honeypot_manage is provided by the Defense MCP server (defense-mcp-server). PolicyLayer sits as a proxy in front of this server to enforce policies before tool calls reach the server.
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